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PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Preventing violent extremism, the Middle East

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Abstract

There are a number of grievances attributed as drivers of violent extremism. Poverty, autocratic governance, human rights violations, precarious masculinities, or the lack of education, mentioning just some, all create what we may term "enabling environments". Still, the majority living in such enabling environments and who experience such grievances do not engage in any acts of violence or join any violent extremist organizations. This begs the question, why do some communities display far greater resilience to violent extremist ideologies than others? Based on in-depth fieldwork in Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq, we study and analyze four cases of the non-occurrence of violent extremism in the Middle East to further our understanding of enabling environments, community resilience, and the decisive moments pushing people to, or away from, violence.

1. Introduction

A number of grievances are attributed as drivers of violent extremism. Poverty, autocratic governance, human rights violations, precarious masculinities, or the lack of education, mentioning just some, all create what we may term "enabling environments". These are areas in which various factors create a conducive situation where segments of its population become prone to violent extremism. Still, the majority who live in such enabling environments and who experience these grievances do *not* engage in any acts of violence or join any extremist organizations. While parts of Mosul's civilian population welcomed the Islamic State (IS) in 2014, for example, others proved particularly resilient to its ideology and actions by covertly engaging in civil disobedience and noncooperation – or even direct sabotage.[1] Similarly, under the so-called Islamic Emirate of Azawad (2012-2013), which was established by the jihadist Ansa Dine and the secular National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (Mouvement national de libération de l'Azawad, MNLA), a number of local imams refused to cooperate with the militants with "numerous displays of disobedience".[2] This begs the question, why do some communities display far greater resilience to violent extremist ideologies than others?

The question matters because groups such as the Islamic State, despite losing its initial foothold in Iraq and Syria, are far from defeated. The same applies to other significant salafi jihadi groups such as Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham and Hurras al-Din in Syria, as we the last fifteen years have "witnessed a remarkable growth in jihadism as a rebel ideology, a military guerrilla force and a global terrorist menace".[3] Meanwhile, there are concerns over future spill-over effects to Jordan and Lebanon – both struggling with the influx of Syrian refugees and the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.[4] There is thus little to suggest that expressions

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[1] See e.g. Mathilde Becker Aarseth, *Mosul under ISIS: Eyewitness Accounts of Life in the Caliphate* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2021); Gina Vale, "Defying Rules. Defying Gender?: Women's Resistance to Islamic State," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2020.1816680; Isak Svensson, Jonathan Hall, Dino Krause & Eric Skoog, "How Ordinary Iraqis Resisted the Islamic State," *The Washington Post*, March 22, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/22/civil-resistance-against-islamic-state-was-much-more-common-than-many-think/; Igor Kossov, "Meet the men who fought ISIS from inside Mosul," *USA Today*, May 2, 2017, https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/05/02/islamic-state-isis-militants-iraq-civilians-resistance/101131176/.

[2] Isak Svensson & Daniel Finnbogason, "Confronting the caliphate? Explaining civil resistance in jihadist proto-states," *European Journal of International Relations* 27: 2 (2021): 581.

[3] Brynjar Lia, "Jihadism in the Arab World After 2011: Explaining its Expansion," *Middle East Quarterly* 23: 4, (2016): 73.

[4] Juline Beaujouan & Amjed Rasheed, "The Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan and Lebanon: Impact and

of violent extremism in the Middle East will disappear in the immediate future.

The question also matters because billions of dollars are spent globally on eliminating drivers of violent extremism through socio-economic improvement, religious dialogue programs, or initiatives to implement improved governance. Yet, there is still little understanding of how these drivers affect and influence populations differently. As noted, while some join violent extremist organizations, others do not – although the latter face the exact same grievances. Consequently, an understanding of why violence does *not occur* is often more relevant when attempting to strengthen community resilience and designing preventive measures, than understanding why it occurs.

In this working paper, we address both a scholarly puzzle and a policy problem. If the aforementioned grievances create enabling environments conducive to violent extremism, why is it that the majority in these situations abstain from violence and reject extremist ideologies? What does this tell us about the role and dynamics in enabling environments? The policy problem relates to who is perceived as being prone to violent extremism and how one evaluates, weighs, and approaches populations in enabling environments. Put bluntly, should a population residing in an enabling environment be treated as future extremists or terrorists, to wit, a problem in need of securitization? In the past, EU funding programs to prevent violent extremism in the Middle East have potentially alienated target populations by implying a view of violent extremism as a predominantly Sunni problem, for example, thus escalating the issue instead of reducing it.[5]

We present four in-depth and context-sensitive cases in Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq. What all cases have in common is that they present and analyze the non-occurrence of violent extremism despite the prevalence of factors significantly increasing its likelihood. Drawing on a number of interviews with Islamist youth, lawyers following cases of violent radicalization, and journalists covering this file, the Egyptian case analyzes a specific segment of disenfranchised Islamist youth from different organizational backgrounds who became radicalized following the ouster of President Muhammad Mursi in July 2013 but who *did not* engage in violence. Similarly, the Jordanian case asks why jihadist violence has not spilled over into the country although the Kingdom harbors some of salafi-jihadism's key theoreticians and is one of the main exporters of jihadist foreign fighters to neighboring conflicts. One of these neighboring conflicts is the Syrian civil-war, and the Syrian case of this working paper analyzes Swedan as one specific case of the non-occurrence of violent extremism in the Syrian eastern countryside. While neighboring villages and tribes of Swedan did not just engage in violent extremism, but also joined the jihadists in Jabhat al-Nusra and IS en masse, Swedan did not. Drawing on survey data with 287 people, the Iraqi case is a comparative study analyzing the non-occurrence of violent extremism in the Nineveh Province and the Kurdistan Region in Iraq. Although all of these cases differ and are affected by different set of local dynamics, we argue that three main factors interplay when causing the non-occurrence of violent extremism: i) ideology, ii) material and social costs, iii) good governance, democratic inclusions, and an economy from which all prosper.

As such, two issues should be addressed. First, violent extremism is a sensitive issue in the MENA region and there are a number of ethical considerations that need to be considered

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implications," *Middle East Policy* 27: 3 (2020): 76-98; Petter Nesser & Henrik Gråtrud, 'When conflicts do not overspill: The case of Jordan', *Perspectives on Politics* 19: 2, 2021, pp. 492-506.

[5] Erik Skare, Kamaran Palani, Stéphane Lacroix, Tine Gade, Dlawer Ala'Aldeen, Kjetil Selvik, Olivier Roy, "Policy brief summarising the EU and other stakeholder's prevention strategy towards violent extremism in the region, Middle East," H2020-SC6-Governance-2019, December 31, 2021, https://www.prevex-balkan-mena.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/PREVEX-D7.1-Policy-Brief-the-Middle-East_FINAL.pdf, 9

when studying this phenomenon. This does not only pertain to those interviewed for this working paper or those potentially involved with violent extremism, but also the researchers involved. Put simply, there are certain things – methods, analyses, and scholarly conclusions – that cannot be carried out or said explicitly without endangering the researcher. This is reflected in this working paper. Second, the COVID-19 pandemic put severe restrictions and limitations on travelling and data-gathering for significant periods of time, and we believe the number of interviews, survey data collected, and the months spent doing fieldwork is no small feat considering this context.

The analysis proceeds in four parts from here. The first section provides an overview of the methodology and research design while the second discusses drivers of violent extremism, the persisting discussion in the scholarly literature on which one of them are decisive, while also introducing our concept of "enabling environments". In the third section, we present four field-sensitive cases from Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt which empirically sheds light on enabling environments and cases of the non-occurrence of violent extremism in these. Finally, we provide conclusive remarks with which we summarize our findings and provide policy recommendations on how to strengthen local resilience.

2. Methods and research design

This working paper is a contribution to the field of modern Middle East studies in general and to the literature on radicalization and violent extremism in particular. As it is a problem-driven (and not a theory-driven) inquiry,[6] the data-gathering has taken the form of a grounded theory study, meaning it was inductive and that the theory evolved as the data was collected and explored. This data took the form of fieldwork through which interviews were carried out and survey data was collected, in addition to desk reviews of existing textual primary and secondary data.

The Egyptian case largely relied on a wide range of resources – including interviews, social media (Facebook and Twitter), as well as media and research materials. More than forty semi-structured interviews were carried out with former Islamists; lawyers following and working on cases of violent extremism in Egypt; as well as journalists who have covered this issue. Through these interviews, we follow the paths of fifty Islamists who were part of the Islamist mobilization against the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliated President Muhammad Mursi in July 2013 in order to analyze their ideas and beliefs on Egyptian political affairs, the legitimacy of violence, the future of the Egyptian Islamist movement, and the balance between non-violent and violent Islamist groups in order to see how these beliefs have changed between January 2011 and July 2013. All interviewees were anonymized both in this working paper and in the notes stored after the interviews took place.

The Syrian case is based on fieldtrips to Deir Ez-Zor between August 2018 and September 2021 during which 130 individuals were interviewed. Although not all interviews are referenced or employed in this working paper, in-depth interviews were carried out in the village of Swedan and the eastern countryside villages referenced in this paper, namely, Zirr, Jurthi, al-Shayl, Tayyana, and Busayra. This includes tribal leaders, notables, former FSA leaders, and oil traders. Additional interviews were made via WhatsApp between September and October 2021 with tribesmen still living in Swedan and those who had resided there but now had moved to Turkey. No audio-recording equipment was used, and all interviewees have been anonymized to protect them from physical or mental harm.

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[6] See e.g. Ian Shapiro, "Problems, Methods, and Theories in the Study of Politics, or What's Wrong with Political Science and What to Do about It," *Political Theory* 30, no. 4 (August 2002), 598.

Similarly, the Jordanian case, on the other hand, relied on interviews with Jordanian experts on the ground, in addition to a desk review of existing textual primary and secondary sources. However, because these experts on jihadism are public figures, there has been no need to anonymize them in this paper. The writings of the main jihadi theorists under house arrests such as Abu Muhammad Maqdisi or Abu Qatada al-Filastini are also available online and there are no associated risks of quoting their works. Nevertheless, the tough approach of the Jordanian security apparatus against anybody who might be accused of not only participating in terrorist actions but simply harboring radical ideas makes it very difficult ethically to interview former radicals or supporters of radical ideas as confidentiality is not guaranteed. The only exception in this working paper is an interview conducted with a lawyer of a young Jordanian man who was sentenced to fifteen years for having downloaded and forwarded a decapitation video. Both lawyer and convicted are anonymized even though the case has been closed at this point.

The Iraqi case is in this sense an outlier insofar as it relied on survey data gathered in the Nineveh Province and in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq (KRI) employed to compare the occurrence and non-occurrence in these two Iraqi regions. The survey consisted of 287 individuals: 121 individuals in the Nineveh Province and 166 in the KRI. As shown by Table I, these individuals belonged to two specific groups of populations: i) individuals residing in enabling environments, including those who have not engaged in violent extremism, and ii) those previously active in organized activities defined as violent extremism, but who have left these organizations for various reasons. Men constituted 66% of the survey in Nineveh (n=80), while women constituted 34% (n=41). Men constituted 77% in the Kurdistan Region (n=127), while women constituted 23% (n=39).

TABLE I: Survey participants for Iraqi case		
	Residents of enabling environments	Previously engaging in violent extremism
The Kurdistan Region	102	64
Nineveh Province	108	13

When gathering survey data, the research team identified individuals who had left violent extremist groups in the KRI in general and in Mosul specifically for the respondent-driven sample process. The research team then contacted them and inquired whether these individuals would be willing to be interviewed. Once survey respondents were found and accepted participating, data-gathering was carried out in-person, employing the PREVEX-developed questionnaire (see Appendix A) on violent extremism, although it was adapted to fit the local context and translated into Kurdish and Arabic. Further, a chain-referral technique (snowball sampling) was employed once these interviews were carried out which led the research team to others in the same situation. To ensure an unbiased sample collection in Kurdistan, enumerators targeted several public places simultaneously to identify potential participants and to ensure fair representation. It was easier to pursue non-random sampling for both groups, especially in places like Halabja where hundreds of people previously affiliated with different Kurdish extremist groups live and are already reintegrated into society. In Mosul, however, we have relied on local research networks to identify potential survey respondents, which has caused a non-random sampling for those previously affiliated with extremist group and fewer respondents in the Mosul category. Still, this was necessary to preserve the safety of the research team and the ethical obligations of conducting fieldwork. Regarding the sampling of individuals living under the rule of violent extremist groups, data were collected from the main neighbourhoods within the city of Mosul and Kurdistan's provinces of Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Halabja. We have divided these cities into different neighbourhoods, and participants were

selected randomly in these neighbourhoods. This approach was chosen to ensure fair representation of different ethno-religious groups living in different parts of the cities.

Last, finding and interviewing respondents previously active in violent extremism has been challenging for the Nineveh Province because they have been members of organization still labeled as terrorist. This has been less complicated in the KRI as repenting violent extremists are not treated as mere terrorists, but instead (attempted) re-integrated into legitimate political processes. For this reason, access to this group within the KRI was possible and easier. Although the methodologies, and the approach to data-gathering, differ, employing four different cases of enabling environments with a corresponding non-occurrence of violent extremism has allowed us to carry out a comparative analysis in order to obtain a greater understanding of the drivers of violent extremism and the decisive moments causing individuals taking the final step to employ violence as a means of political change. By comparing the four cases, we assess what drivers of violent extremism existed and were in common for our all cases, which drivers were specific for just one enabling environment, and what factors contributed to the non-occurrence of violent extremism. Although more research is required, by assessing what these four cases of non-occurrence in Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq have in common, and analyzing how they differ, we will have a greater understanding of how violent extremism is triggered or prevented.

3. Drivers of violent extremism: introducing the 'enabling environment'

3.1 Possible drivers of violent extremism (and the lack of scholarly consensus)

Despite the scholarly consensus that some factors increase the chance of violent extremism, there are nevertheless persisting debates on what *the* decisive drivers of violent extremism in the Middle East actually are. Some suggest that poverty, marginalization, and the lack of socio-economic status are prominent drivers of violent extremism as "the typical extremist who supports attacks on civilians tends to be relatively young (below 33), unemployed and struggling to make ends meet, poorly educated, and not as religious as others but more willing to sacrifice own life for his or her beliefs."[7] This corresponds with what we know about the recruitment of foreign fighters to IS where "the lack of economic opportunities in the form of unemployment" appear to have been an obvious driver.[8]

Socio-economic status does not appear to have been a decisive driver in other cases, however. When analyzing the recruitment to another salafi-jihadi organization, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), for example, one sees instead that "the primacy of politics and ideology seems to apply to radicalization processes in Saudi Arabia as it does elsewhere,"[9] and one cross-country survey including a number of MENA countries reveals that "the level of education, unemployment status and food affordability on their own do not have significant impacts on the support for [violent extremism]."[10] To highlight how differently socio-economic

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[7] Youssouf Kiendrebeogo & Elena Ianchovichina, "Who Supports Violent Extremism in Developing Countries? Analysis of Attitudes Based on Value Surveys," Policy Research Working Paper 7691 (World Bank Group Middle East and North Africa Region, 2016), 35.

[8] Mohamed Abdel Jelil, Kartika Bhatia, Anne Brockmeyer, Quy-Toan Do & Clément Joubert, "What Drives Youth to Violent Extremism? Evidence from the Islamic State Group's Foreign Recruits," Working Paper no. 1293 (Dokki, Giza: Economic Research Forum, 2019), 24.

[9] Thomas Hegghammer, "Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization in Saudi Arabia," *Middle East Policy* 13: 4 (2006): 53.

[10] Ramya M. Vijaya, Anthony Wilent, Jessica Cathcart & Ryan Fiorellini, "Economic Underpinnings of Violent Extremism: A Cross Country Exploration of Repeated Survey Data," *World Development* 109 (2018): 410.

data is employed and analyzed, and how greatly conclusions may differ, while Krueger and Maleçkova claim that Palestinian suicide bombers are "at least as likely to come from economically advantaged families … as to come from the ranks of the economically disadvantaged"[11] and Benmelech et al. claim they have an overall higher education rate compared to the average Palestinian,[12] Skare argues that Palestinian Islamist militants generally reflect the labor divisions and education level of overall Palestinian society.[13]

There is similarly no agreement on the role of autocratic leadership and human rights violations as a potential driver of violent extremism with a number of works testing the so-called inclusion-moderation thesis in MENA (whether inclusion in democratic processes causes political moderation).[14] On the one hand, the so-called "political access school" claims that democracy provides greater opportunities for terrorists to join mainstream politics. The "strategic school", on the other, maintains that democracies are more tempting targets for terrorism because they respect civil liberties constraining effective counter-terrorism.[15] In fact, we see that "more liberal Middle-Eastern political systems are actually more susceptible to the threat of terrorism than are the more dictatorial regimes,"[16] and "increases in the strength of democracy are [between 1980 and 2016] associated with significant increases in terrorist attacks among Middle Eastern countries."[17]

Still, we may generally frame the turn to political violence and to violent extremism as caused by a developing *discontent*, followed by the *politicization* of that discontent, and, finally, *its actualization* through the execution of violence against political objects or actors.[18] This actualization of discontent is, broadly speaking, caused by the discrepancy between value expectations (goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are entitled) and value

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[11] Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Malečková, "Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There A Causal Connection?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17, no. 4 (2003): 141.

[12] Efraim Benmelech, Claude Berrebi and Esteban F. Klor, "Economic Conditions and the Quality of Suicide Terrorism," *The Journal of Politics* 74, no. 1 (2012), 115.

[13] Erik Skare "Affluent and Well-Educated? Analyzing the Socio-Economic Backgrounds of Fallen Palestinian Islamist Militants," *The Middle East Journal* [forthcoming Winter 2022].

[14] See e.g. Jillian Schwedler, *Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Janine A. Clark, "The Conditions of Islamist Moderation: Unpacking Cross-Ideological Cooperation in Jordan," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 38: 4 (2006): 539-560; Jillian Schwedler, "Islamists in Power? Inclusion, Moderation, and the Arab Uprisings," *Middle East Development Journal* 5: 1 (2013): 1-18; Sumita Pahwa, "Pathways of Islamist Adaptation: The Egyptian Muslim Brothers' lessons for inclusion moderation theory," *Democratization* 24: 6 (2017): 1066-1084; Dara Conduit, "Political Participation of Islamists in Syria: Examining the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood's Mid-Century Democratic Experiment," *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 30: 1 (2017): 23-41; Hanlie Booysen, "Explaining the Moderation Platform of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood: Against the Inclusion-Moderation Thesis," (PhD thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 2018); Khalil al-Anani, "The Inclusion-Moderation Thesis: Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt," *Oxford Research Encyclopedias*, August 28, 2019, https://oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-1332; Esen Kirdiş, "Similar Contexts, Different Behaviour: Explaining the Non-Linear Moderation and Immoderation of Islamic Political Parties in Jordan Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey," *Politics, Religion & Ideology* 20: 4 (2019): 467-483; Joas Wagemakers, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020);

[15] James A. Piazza, "Draining the Swamp: Democracy Promotion, State Failure, and Terrorism in 19 Middle Eastern Countries," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 30 (2007): 522-523.

[16] Piazza, "Draining the Swamp," 536.

[17] Nancy A. Morris, Gary LaFree & Eray Karlidag, "Counter-terrorism policies in the Middle East: Why democracy has failed to reduce terrorism in the Middle East and why protecting human rights might be more succesful," *Criminology & Public Policy* 20 (2021): 168.

[18] Ted Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, 40th anniv. ed. (London, New York: Routledge, 2011), 12.

capabilities (what goods and conditions of life they actually get).[19] One example is the Second Intifada (2000-2005), as the Palestinians believed they would obtain an independent Palestinian state with the commencement of the peace process of the 1990s (value expectations), yet engaged in protests and armed insurgency from September 2000 when they saw the Israel occupation deepening instead of abating (actual value capabilities).[20]

3.2 Competing authorities: From centralized to localized control

The Arab Spring can itself be read as a case of relative deprivation insofar as one witnessed the eruption of discontent caused by the absence of democratic rules to which populations in the Middle East believed they were entitled. However, with the turmoil following the Arab Spring in 2011 and the proliferation of enabling environments in the Middle East, several have suggested that there is a dichotomous choice between "authoritarian stability" or "Islamic anarchy" to prevent violent extremism.[21] The logic seems to be the following: If the war of ideas cannot be won or drivers of violent extremism cannot be removed in the short-term, then heavy-handed repression by Arab strongmen must be encouraged.

One may nevertheless question just how realistic "authoritarian stability" is considering the historical political instability in MENA – with the Islamist Uprising in Syria between 1976 and 1982,[22] the storming of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in Saudi Arabia in 1979,[23] or the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981 and subsequent escalation of Islamic political violence in Egypt in the 1990s,[24] mentioning just a few. As Filiu notes: "The horrendous record of the [rulers] in Algeria, Egypt, Syria and Yemen should have obliterated any illusion about [Arab autocrats'] questionable contribution to domestic and regional 'stability'."[25]

In fact, as considerable parts of the population in the broader MENA region live in fragile states, with governments lacking the capacity or willingness to care for and protect their citizens, many view the state not as benevolent, but instead as dysfunctional and corrupt. This causes grievances willingly instrumentalized by so-called "violent entrepreneurs". One of the best examples is the Iraqi Sunni tribes, which joined IS' offensive in 2014 not because they sympathized with its ideology but because they perceived the movement as a bulwark against

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[19] Ted Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, 12-13.

[20] Jeremy Pressman, "The Second Intifada: Background and Causes of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Studies* 23: 2 (2003): 119.

[21] For a discussion on the pros and cons of this choice, see e.g. James Traub, "Bashar al Assad and the Devil's Bargain," *Foreign Policy*, November, 2014, https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/14/bashar-al-assad-and-the-devils-bargain/; Dominic Tierney, "Basha al-Assad and the Devil's Gambit," *The Atlantic*, July 16, 2014, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/07/assad-and-the-art-of-the-devils-gambit/374501/; Oleksandr Turchynov, "A devil's bargain in Syria," *Dawn*, December 5, 2015, https://www.dawn.com/news/1224204; Daniel Byman, "Should we work with the devil we know against the Islamic State?" *Brookings*, November 21, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/11/21/should-we-work-with-the-devil-we-know-against-the-islamic-state/.

[22] See e.g. Brynjar Lia, "The Islamist Uprising in Syria, 1976-82: The History and Legacy of a Failed Revolt," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 43: 4 (2016): 541-559.

[23] Thomas Hegghammer & Stéphane Lacroix, *The Meccan Rebellion. The Story of Juhayman al-'Utaybi Revisited* (Bristol: Amal Press, 2011).

[24] See e.g. Mohammad M. Hafez & Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement," in *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory*, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 61-88.

[25] Jean-Pierre Filiu, *From Deep State to Islamic State: The Arab Counter-Revolution and its Jihadi Legacy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 251.

the Baghdad government's sectarian agenda.[26]

The fragmentation of state authority matters for several of the cases analyzed in this working paper (particularly for the Syrian case) because it does not necessarily equal the disappearance of authority altogether. Instead, it often signifies the shift of authority from the central to the local level with the emergence of various and different types of enabling environments depending on the strength of actor(s) aiming to capitalize. One enabling environment may be one specific geographical area in which an armed group has monopolized the use of force while providing public goods and services ("rebelocracy"), as was the case with IS in Syria. Another geographical area may be one in which a different armed group has monopolized violence while leaving social services to others such as civic leaders or traditional communal or religious leaders ("aliocracy"),[27] as was the case when AQAP took control of Mukalla in the Yemeni Hadramawt Governorate.[28] As in rebel governance, one can safely assume that there is an 1) *actor* dimension; 2) an *institutional* setting; and 3) *resources* and *power* asymmetries that facilitate and shape various forms of enabling environments.[29]

An enabling environment in Jordan may thus not necessarily be identical to those in certain parts of Syria – and an enabling environment in Iraq is not necessarily identical to one in Egypt. We are confident that the great variation in cases analyzed in this working paper provides a solid foundation to study the occurrence and non-occurrence of violent extremism.

3.3 The context making up 'enabling evironments'

Despite this persisting lack of scholarly consensus, it is nevertheless understood that certain situations are more volatile than others. It is these volatile situations we define as "enabling environment" in this working paper, to wit, an area in which the combination of factors creates a conducive condition in which the likelihood of turning to violent extremism increases significantly. This analytical framework rests on three main features: "decisive moments", cases of "occurrence and non-occurrence of violent extremism", and the effect of preventive measures.

As such, we refer to "decisive moments" when describing and analyzing situations in which a particular grievance is, or is *not*, transformed into violence. That is, while ideological radicalization and cognitive extremism is "a necessary precursor for violent extremism"[30] it is necessary to obtain a better understanding of the very moments in which this transformation takes place. As Roy notes, "radicalization … is *in fine* a choice, a personal choice that becomes a political choice, and it is both pointless and counterproductive to view it as a sort of brainwashing … ."[31] Consequently, while some made the choice of joining IS and engaging in violent extremism on its behalf in Syria and Iraq (an occurrence of violent extremism), others did not (a non-occurrence of violent extremism) despite being exposed to the same set of drivers

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[26] Daveed Gartenstein-Ross & Sterling Jensen, "The role of Iraqi Tribes after the Islamic State's Ascendance," *Military Review* 95: 2 (2015): 108.

[27] On "rebelocracy" and "aliocracy", see Ana Arjona, *Rebelocracy: Social Order in the Colombian Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 5.

[28] Svensson & Finnbogason, "Confronting the caliphate?": 586.

[29] This is what constitutes "non-state governance" when defined by *external* actors (armed non-state groups) providing governance in less regulated manner (the institutional setting) with the use of material and ideational resources (the asymmetry factor). See Thomas Risse, "Governance Configurations in Areas of Limited Statehood: Actors, Modes, Institutions, and Resources," SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, no. 32 (Berlin: DFG Research Center, 2012), 22.

[30] Jakob Guhl, "Why beliefs always matter, but rarely help us predict jihadist violence. The role of cognitive extremism as a precursor for violent extremism," *Journal of Deradicalization* 14 (2018): 207.

[31] Olivier Roy, *Jihad and Death: The Global Appeal of Islamic State* (London: Hurst & Company, 2017), 98.

of violent extremism (being situated in the same environment enabling violent extremism). We pay particular attention to cases of non-occurrence of violent extremism in enabling environments and analyze why some communities display much greater resilience to violent extremist ideologies than others. We assess the role and importance of local community and religious leaders, the role of tribal affiliation, ideological exposure, good governance and political inclusion, and poverty and marginalization.

4. Factors shaping the non-occurrence of violent extremism among radical Egyptian youth

4.1 The case

On July 3, 2013, the Egyptian military ended the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood after only one year in power – all with the support by a significant segment of the Egyptian population, including the judiciary, the political opposition, and prominent Christian and Muslim religious representatives. Supporters of the Muslims Brothers protested and insisted that they would remain in the streets until the Muslim Brotherhood affiliated president Mohammed Morsi returned to power. Persisting with sit-ins in Cairo and Giza, Egyptian security forces nevertheless dispersed the protestors forty days later, on August 14. Angry and defeated, some of these Brotherhood youths would leave the square to either join or establish violent groups. Others, however, did not. This begs the question, why did some of the defeated protestors decide to take up arms against the regime, while others did not, and what factors contributed to the non-occurrence of Egyptian violent opposition? Indeed, according to the oft-cited contributing factors leading to radicalization and violence – e.g., political, social, or religious grievances – we should, in theory, expect a far greater number of alienated populations joining violent groups. Still, in Muslim societies such as Egypt, only a minority do so.

Drawing on fifty cases collected through interviews we carried out with former members of the Muslim Brotherhood, lawyers, and journalists, in addition to written materials collected over the last five years, we employ the case of disenfranchised Islamist youths who participated in the failed sit-is organized by their movement, and the factors shaping violent radicalization in Egypt post-2013, to fill this theoretical gap. We argue that although a considerable segment of this did adopt a radical approach towards political change in Egypt – including the acceptance of violence as a means to achieve political goals – the majority did not take the final step because they lacked the suitable ideational frame, the material capacity, as well as a leadership perceived as legitimate to do so. As one former member of the Muslim Brotherhood sarcastically put it: "It is not that they do not want [to engage in violence], it is that they cannot".[32]

4.2 The background

Most of the Islamist youth who took part in the non-violent uprising in Egypt in January-February 2011, and the subsequent electoral process in the transitional period, had a staunch belief in the feasibility of non-violence and peaceful protests as a mode of resistance. Indeed, several of them even accused radical groups at the time – such as the Revolutionary Socialists and 6th of April Youth Movement – of either being politically immature or of seeking to disturb the transitional period through dramatic acts to disallow Islamists in power. This was illustrated by the fact that many of the Islamist youths continued to demonstrate against the new regime

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[32] Former MB member, personal communication with Nouran Ahmed and Georges Fahmi, December 26, 2018.

of Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi every Friday and to demand the return of Mursi. This continued on a weekly basis throughout late-2013 and 2014.

Yet, as the post-2013 regime consolidated its power, a considerable segment of the Islamist youth was left frustrated, disillusioned, and with an increasingly radical attitude on how to obtain political change most effectively in Egypt. In fact, many of those who in January 2011 believed in nonviolent action to implement political change now openly called their own position at the time as unfeasible. They rejected the Muslim Brotherhood's reformist approach post-2011 and argued that the movement should have taken more radical steps to eliminate the networks of the old regime and implement revolutionary change to the country. As one former member of the Muslim Brotherhood, who left the organization in 2013, suggested, the leadership of the Brotherhood were naïve and opportunistic for seeking compromises with Egyptian state institutions after the downfall of Husni Mubarak.[33] Suddenly, many of them now found themselves politically aligned with the groups they had criticized years earlier, such as the Revolutionary Socialists. According to one Islamist leader, the struggle was now not about Islamists versus the state, but revolutionary forces against the counter-revolution, and – although an Islamist – he considered the Revolutionary Socialists and the 6 April Movement as an ally in this struggle.[34] Further, the office of a Muslim Brotherhood branch adhering to the radical line of MB leader Muhammad Kamal in Istanbul even featured photos of Islamist figures such as Abdallah Azzam and Sayyid Qutb alongside photos of Che Guevara, Martin Luther King Jr. and Gandhi.[35]

As such, contemporary Islamists do not focus on the religiosity or piety of their leaders to the same extent as earlier Egyptian Islamists, such as Sayyid Qutb, who framed the struggle against the Egyptian ruling elites as "not a political, not an economic struggle, not a racial struggle … but [a] struggle over religious doctrine".[36] Instead, the discourse contemporary Islamist youths employ has largely focused on earthly politics with few references to religious doctrine. Consequently, while Qutb framed the struggle in the 1960s as that between believers and non-believers, Islamist youth framed their struggle against the post-2013 regime as one between the revolution and the counter-revolution; and while Qutb labelled his enemies as "infidels", the Brotherhood youth referred to them as "occupiers".[37] Similarly, while many of the youths adopted a critical position towards the Coptic minority in Egypt, they mainly criticized them for their *political* support in ending the reign of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2013, and one Islamist claimed that the Copts' support to the post-2013 political regime would lead to their bloodshed.[38] A similar, aggressive attitude is found against the Salafi Nour party, as the Islamist youth present a similar critique accusing the Salafis of being nothing more than "security informants". The core of the Islamist MB youths' criticism consequently remains political.

Despite the disillusionment of the Islamist youth with peaceful protests and

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[33] Former MB member, personal communication with Nouran Ahmed and Georges Fahmi, March 25, 2019.

[34] Hazim al-Wakil, "Qiyādī jihādī: qaṭaʿnā shawṭan kabīran fī al-taqārub maʿ "6 abrīl" wa-"l-ishtirākiyyīn al-thawriyyīn"," *al-Watan*, June 2, 2014, https://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/495949.

[35] Muhammad Afan, "Min ʿAbdallāh ʿAzzām ilā Guevara.. al-Thawra ḍālat al-muʿmin,"*Arabi Post*, November 18, 2019, https://arabicpost.net/opinions/2019/11/18/من-عبدالله-عزام-إلى-جيفار ا-الثورة-ضالة/.

[36] Sayyid Qutb, *Maʿālim fī al-ṭarīq* 11th ed. (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūk, 1987), 201.

[37] Mokhtar Awad, "What Egypt's Assassination Attempts Say about its Islamist Insurgency," *Atlantic Council*, October 3, 2016, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/what-egypt-s-assassination-attempts-say-about-its-islamist-insurgency/.

[38] Eric Trager (@EricTrager18). "Disgusting post by Muslim Brother: Christians must reconcile w/Muslims 'or their blood will continue to run like rivers & nobody will care'," *Twitter*, May 26, 2017, https://twitter.com/erictrager18/status/868102100802297856.

experiencing a process of political radicalization, only a minority of them took the final step to violence as a means of political change. In the following section, we suggest that there are three main factors shaping the non-occurrence of violent extremism: ideology, pragmatic cost/benefit calculations, and the presence of legitimate non-violent countercurrents.

4.3 Factors contributing to the non-occurrence of violent extremism

4.3.1 Ideology

As Roy has argued, religious ideas only play a secondary role in the process of violent radicalization.[39] Still, that is not to suggest that they do not play a significant role as they frame the struggle, identify the goal to be attained, as well as the path toward achieving it. Without these ideas, any meaningful transition towards violence becomes less likely.

As such, a salafi-jihadi frame offered to some youth an answer to their questions, and the aforementioned writings of the Islamist thinker Qutb in the 1960s have offered a conceptual frame for many youths to make sense of the post-2013 political environment. Qutb's famous book *Milestones* (1964), for example, has offered an explanation to the post-colonial regime in Egypt, in addition to the persecution of the country's Islamists. In Qutb's own words, political regimes that did not implement the rules of Islam, were infidel by nature, and the struggle to topple it was consequently a struggle over religious doctrine, nothing else, to wit, its two sides were the believers against non-believers. In fact, the enemies of the believers may wish to change this struggle into an economic or political, or even a racial struggle, so that the believers become confused concerning the struggle's true nature and deprive them of their most effective weapon: the pure Islamic creed. Yet, as Qutb suggests, had the struggle been economic or political by nature, then settling the issue would have been unproblematic and providing solutions to the prevailing difficulties would have been simple.[40]

It was only after the radicalization process had commenced that the Islamist youth begun looking for ideas that fitted with their radical political approach in order to make sense of the political crisis they were facing; and the decision to embrace jihadist ideas came only after the relevant political convictions had been deeply rooted. That is, angry youth looked for ideas to frame their decision to practice violence. These ideas, however, were not merely a tool for political radicalization. It would be a mistake to think of it as just a rubber stamp to an already made decision to take up arms. The adopted ideational frame could change their world views entirely, including towards the initial trigger of the process of political radicalization.

In our case – i.e., disenfranchised and disillusioned Islamist youth –, the ousting of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2013 constituted this trigger. Moreover, in all cases of Egyptian Islamist youth who subsequently decided to take up arms, we see that they all underwent a period in which they searched for, and studied, literature justifying violence. One example of how a newly found jihadist frame assisted a cognitive transition was one Muslim Brotherhood support who initially protested the ouster of Morsi, but now argued that what happened to him occurred because he did not rule by what God had revealed and resorted to democracy.[41]

Religion has nevertheless constituted a barrier to violence, as well, as religiously moderate political groups have provided religiously informed counterarguments against jihadist currents. The Muslim Brotherhood has, for example, rejected the jihadist doctrine of

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[39] Olivier Roy, "Who Are The New Jihadis?" *The Guardian*, April 13, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/apr/13/who-are-the-new-jihadis.

[40] Qutb, *Maʿālim fī al-ṭarīq*, 202.

[41] Arij, "Made in Prison. Third Generation of Jihadists in Egyptian Prisons," *Arij*, no date, https://arij.net/made_in_prison_en/.

excommunicating state officials and using violence to achieve their political goals, and institutionalized the rejection of these ideas into its membership rules. As such, excommunication and violence were the two main determining factors deciding whether one could become a regular member of the Brotherhood or not, and there were clear orders not to allow full membership if there were any doubts over his or her views on these two issues. A former member of the Brotherhood referred to these rules: "When we were visiting a supporter of the Brotherhood, the head of our group saw a photo of Usama bin Laden in his room. He refused to promote him to full membership."[42] Others who followed a religious education at al-Azhar religious institute faced this same ideational barrier. Religion was thus employed to both legitimize and delegitimize political violence in Egyptian society.

Egyptian Islamist youth have consequently reacted to this ideational barrier differently post-2013. Some indeed have accepted the fact that violence is not a viable option. Others do not reject violence on pacifist grounds but are conflicted on the permissibility of killing Egyptians and engaging in internal violence and the prospects of potentially killing other Muslims. One response has consequently been travelling to the Syrian civil war, arguing that the battle is clear there between Muslims and non-Muslims, and hence they believe they do not need to think about the validity of the literature on the excommunication of Muslims. Others said that in Syria the line between the good an evil is clear, unlike the case in Egypt after 2013. This was the case of an Egyptian photographer who studied at al-Azhar university, but subsequently travelled to Syria and joined Jabhat al-Nusra. Although he went through a phase of political radicalization and began delving into salafi-jihadi literature, he refused to practice violence inside Egypt, arguing that he could not kill innocent Egyptians, and instead argued that the fight in Syria had clear boundaries. Further, although the battle against the Syrian regime was a legitimate one, he nevertheless refused to join IS for the same reason he left Egypt: He refused to kill fellow Muslims. Another case was a young preacher who used to give lessons to young men at social clubs, charities, and on YouTube on how to live according to religious teachings in the modern world. After the ouster of Morsi, he accepted the use of violence as a legitimate tool to achieve political change. Still, violence was impermissible within Egypt, and he thus decided to travel to Syria instead to what he described as "a clearer, less complicated battle".[43]

Others, such as one particular wing in the Muslim Brotherhood, have appealed to sympathetic religious scholars to offer a non-salafi-jihadi ideational frame to the practice of a limited level of violence as a strategy to resist the political regime. This committee of religious scholars issued a document called The *Jurisprudence of Popular Resistance to the Coup*. The document offered religious justification for the use of violence against security forces by underlining the religious concept of "repelling the assailant", which is a perceived equivalent to the modern concept of the right to self-defense. This ideological framework insisted on a wide range of degrees and choices between non-violence and fully armed confrontation. According to its religious approach, the assailant should be resisted in a gradual manner, starting with the least costly measures, such as employing threats. The authors of the document were careful to insist that the strategy did not constitute a shift in the Muslim Brotherhood's approach but only a shift in its attitude, which might change according to circumstances as long as it remained within the religious limits. The document also placed several limits on the use of violence, for example a ban on attacking security officers that were not involved in attacking

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[42] Former MB member, personal communication with Nouran Ahmed and Georges Fahmi, March 28, 2019.
[43] Sherif Mohy El Deen, "Youth Radicalisation in Egypt and the Complicated Relationship to Violence," *Arab Reform Initative*, September 26, 2016, https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/youth-radicalisation-in-egypt-and-the-complicated-relationship-to-violence/.

protesters, in addition to abstaining from violence against the families of police officers involved in violence against protesters.[44]

Indeed, this ideological framework was distinct from salafi-jihadist ideology, insofar as the latter relied on the principle of excommunication as the basis for the military struggle against state institutions to achieve Islamic governance. The former approach, however, never excommunicated members of the security forces and insisted instead that they should be resisted because of their actions rather than the adherence to their faith.

4.3.2 Cost/benefit calculations

Based on the ideational frame adopted to make sense of the political crisis they face, youth are likely to weigh the costs and benefits of taking up arms against Egyptian state institutions. This is not an easy decision, particularly because Egypt enjoys strong security apparatuses. Engaging in violence comes with sacrifices, including personal ones for the perpetrator and for his or her family members.

The Muslim Brotherhood youth who considered violent actions had two main concerns that led them to renounce such an option. The first factor was the power disparity between them and the security forces they faced, which made many of them believe it was impossible to triumph militarily.[45] The second factor was the lack of support from their local societies, which, most often, was the case within families. One member of the Brotherhood, for example, was rejected by a part of his family after he was released from prison.[46] Other members were shocked to find that they were attacked by the residents of their neighborhoods to prevent them from protesting there.[47] This high level of popular resentment combined with the inherent imbalance between clandestine armed groups and Egyptian state security forced made the costs greater than the benefits.

4.3.3 Legitimate non-violent countercurrents

A third factor contributing to the non-occurrence of violent extremism was the heavy presence and impact of voices within the movement deemed politically and religiously legitimate that rejected the use of violence. Indeed, although the senior Brotherhood member who at one point acted as the movement's de facto leader, Muhammad Kamal, advocated violence, a number of opposing voices in the leadership contested the legitimacy of this political line. The historical leadership both in Egypt and abroad rejected the violent approach adopted by the new leadership in Egypt and accused Kamal of seeking to militarize the Muslim Brotherhood. These opposing voices included Mahmoud Ezzat, the deputy Supreme Guide, and Mahmoud Hussein, the Secretary-general of the movement.[48]

Another case of voices perceived as legitimate and which oppose violence is the Salafi Front, an Egyptian Salafi group that emerged after the uprising on January 25, 2011. While the movement supported Mursi, and many of them ended up in prison after 2013, they engaged in debates with ISIS members in prison and disputed their ideological claims. Importantly, because these Salafis had the moral and religious authority, they were able to talk with radical

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[44] Mekameleen TV, "Ḥadīth tārikhī maʿ D. Majdī Shalash ʿuḍw al-lajna al-idāriyya al-ʿulyā li-l-ikhwān wa ṣadīq D. Muhammad Kamāl," *YouTube*, October 6, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ffxvHduo064.

[45] Egyptian journalist, personal communication with Nouran Ahmed and Georges Fahmi, January 19, 2019.

[46] Former MB member, personal communication with Nouran Ahmed and Georges Fahmi, March 28, 2019.

[47] Salih Ramadan, "al-Ahālī yuʿlinūn al-nafīr al-ʿām ḍidd 'al-maḥẓūra'.. wa qarār shaʿbī bi-tahjīr al-ikhwān min 'al-manṣūra'," *al-Watan*, December 26, 2013, https://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/380065.

[48] Mahmud Hussayn, "Rudūd ʿalā baʿḍ taʾassulāt," *Alamat Online*, February 9, 2016, http://alamatonline.com/archives/7083.

youth and persuade them from joining IS. This stood in contrast to visiting religious scholars invited by the security apparatus, who were perceived as the mouthpiece of the regime. According to one Islamist in prison, he believed the Salafi Front was the main reason he did not turn to IS in prison.[49]

This process is not unidirectional, however, as many detained youths from the Muslim Brotherhood perceive Muslim leaders to be passive towards Egyptian prison authorities. As described by several Muslim Brotherhood members who spent time in prison, the leaders of the movement have often cooperated with the prison authorities to control their own cells and make sure its members follow the prison rules. This attitude has left some of the youth prisoners disappointed, which has made them an easy target for other salafi jihadis in prison. Moreover, while Brotherhood leaders are perceived as passive, IS prisoners often defy prison officers, which increases their legitimacy among more moderate Islamist detainees.[50]

4.3.4 Summary

This section has analyzed the non-occurrence of violent extremism among disenfranchised Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist youth following the ouster of Egyptian President Muhammad Mursi in July 2013. Doing so, we have distinguished between the radicalization process itself and the moment this turns into violence. As demonstrated, a significant segment of these youths has, indeed, undergone a radicalization process, yet without engaging in violence. This has only been the case for a minority of them.

Religious convictions have played a significant role in shaping individual decision-making. Salafi jihadism offers a frame with which the political struggle can be understood by reducing it to religious doctrine. It also shapes the weight of both costs and benefits leading youth to follow this path despite the unbalance of power between these armed groups and Egyptian security forces, and finally the legitimate life path of Jihadi figures such as Qutb and Abdullah Azzam lead youth to read their work with admiration and respect. Muslim youths who follow the religious line of al-Azhar or the Muslim Brotherhood, on the other hand, are less likely to accept the salafi jihadi frame. Instead, when members of the Muslim Brotherhood have justified the use of violence based on ideas such as political resistance and self-defense, the power imbalance between them and state security forces are emphasized to such an extent that many have given up this approach.

Finally, countercurrents perceived as legitimate by those undergoing a radicalization process play an important role. The aforementioned resistance shown to the violent strategy suggested by Kamal dissuaded a significant number of Brotherhood activists from pursuing this line and the detained Salafi Front members similarly prevented prisoners from joining the IS.

5. Factors shaping the non-occurrence of violent extremism in Jordan

5.1 The case and the background

A small country of 10 million inhabitants, Jordan has managed to maintain its stability in a challenging geopolitical context by opening its borders to Arab refugees from neighboring countries and a strict control of its population by well-trained security forces. The paradox of

[49] Abdelrahman Ayyash, "Strong Organization, Weak Ideology: Muslim Brotherhood Trajectories in Egyptian Prisons Since 2013," *Arab Reform Initiative*, April 29, 2019, https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/strong-organization-weak-ideology-muslim-brotherhood-trajectories-in-egyptian-prisons-since-2013/.
[50] Muhammad Khayal, "Hunā Ṭura".. Markaz Ḥukūmī li-tajnīd "al-dawāʿish"," April 21, 2016, https://cms.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=21042016&id=2b8f13ca-e5d8-4b0f-8868-d24288fa4161.

Jordan is that the country was also a hotbed of jihadi recruitment for fighting in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria from the 1980s to 2017, while also nurturing some of the main theorists of international jihadism. Abdallah Azzam, Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, and Abu Qatada al-Filastini were all part of the first wave of Jordanian "global jihadists" who went to Afghanistan in the mid-1980s to fight the Soviet invasion -either as militants or as theoreticians. Indeed, in this period, nearly 600 Jordanians went to Afghanistan to fight, and the country began to suffer a problem with foreign fighters with the experience and willingness to carry out violence.

The issue of Jordanian foreign fighters in the 1980s was further exacerbated by both regional and internal Jordanian developments in the 1990s. First, 300.000 Jordanians were expelled from the Gulf countries in 1991 after Jordan's King Hussein expressed his support to Saddam Hussein's occupation of Kuwait. Influenced by the Saudi Wahhabism during their stay, they brought the hardline interpretation of Islam home with them. Popular Jordanian sentiments hardened further in this period as the Jordanian monarchy reapproached Israel, the US intervened militarily with the First Gulf War, and the number of mosques increased dramatically in the country as it underwent a so-called "Revolution of Mosques".[51] The combination of foreign fighters and hardening Jordanian popular sentiments meant that a new breeding ground for salafi-jihadism was created, and suddenly militant groups were established in the Kingdom – from the Bay'at al-Imam group, which was established by al-Zarqawi and al-Maqdisi in 1993 after their return from Afghanistan to the Jaysh Muhammad, which was established in Eastern Amman. Consequently, there was a persistent salafi-jihadi presence in Jordan from the early-1990s.

Today, important factors contributing to Jordanian enabling environments have largely been left untreated, willingly or otherwise. Jordanian social inequalities have, for example, grown over the past thirty years following a shift towards a neo-liberal economy. The IMF austerity policies have further led to a pressure on salaries and employment conditions, while the Jordanian government has pushed for job creation without sufficient social protection. In other words, Jordanian fiscal economy is not structured to benefit the country's working class. Similarly, Jordanian authorities have not invested sufficiently in public education, classes are a more than 50 children, additional classes have been built within the courtyards. This has forced those who can pay – one third of the Jordanian population – to pay for a private education.[52] Certainly, there are compensating counter-factors as Jordan benefits from the 800.000 Jordanians who work abroad (approximately 250.000 workers, in addition to their families), whose remittances alleviate dire social conditions.

The economic recession and prevailing corruption, in combination with the lack of open and legal Jordanian outlets to express discontent, have consequently become obvious triggers of radicalization, while youth unemployment is at 25 percent. The average apartment rent has multiplied from 2004 to 2015 according to Census, and the majority of unmarried youth live with their parents, looking for daily work opportunities, hanging with other inactive friends. If there are job opportunities, then young men must most often access jobs through mechanisms of nepotism and corruption (*wasṭa*) and the combination of rising apartment rents and unemployment complicates the prospects of marriage and normal lives.

Equally important, there are almost no open and legal outlets for the population to express its discontent. Following 1970 Black September when the Jordanian army crushed the PLO militias, all Palestinians political movement have been banned. Workers and student

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[51] Hassan Abu Hanieh, interview with Myriam Ababsa, October 12, 2021, Amman.
[52] Ahmad Awad, interview with Myriam Ababsa, 12th october, 2021, Amman.

unions have been put under strict control or banned after the 2019 Labor law. The Muslim Brothers organization, which was allowed to set up a political party, the Islamic Action Party, in 1992, was banned in 2020.

It should, then, not be a surprise that Jordan is one of the nations today that has provided the greatest number of jihadists to Syria, Iraq, and, subsequently, Libya, and between 3.000 and 4.000 Jordanians joined the Islamic State (IS) the last decade, which poses a great challenge to the Kingdom.[53] Nearly 800 Jordanian jihadists have been killed in conflict zones, and, according to Hassan Abu Hanieh, approximately 10.000 Jordanians are today considered as salafi-jihadi sympathizers, with the Palestinian refugee camps constituting hotbeds.[54] Still, although Jordan has suffered several terrorist attacks on its own soil (in November 2005, in particular), jihadism is mainly an article for export, and even if the jihadists might have benefitted from initial Jordanian public sympathy (at least before the execution of ISIS' execution of the Jordanian pilot, Mu'adh al-Kasasba in February 2015), there is no active clandestine party or organization, political or religious, that can contribute spreading any salafi-jihadi influence in the population. This begs the question: While the poor economic, social, and political situation in Jordan contribute to creating enabling environments in which Jordanian youth are exposed to radicalization in general and violent extremism in particular, why is this radicalization exported abroad instead of being implemented domestically? That is, why do we not have more terrorist activity within Jordan?

5.2 Factors contributing to the non-occurrence of violent extremism

There are mainly two factors that explain the non-occurrence of violent extremism in Jordan. The first is the "hard" measures that the Jordanian authorities have implemented with strict state sanctions, financial control over terrorism groups, and the imprisonment of any suspect with harsh interrogations. The second are the "softer" measures focusing on the educational and ideological aspects, in addition to rehabilitation programs for those who have joined al-Qaida or IS.[55]

One soft approach is the Jordanian authorities' approach of formulating and developing a "moderate Islam" in order to undermine the religious legitimacy of the jihadists' arguments, combined with taking control of mosques and dismissing mosque preachers and imams who are perceived by the Jordanian authorities as radicals. Officially endorsed and publicized, the main aim is to frame the harmony and non-violence of religious doctrine in order to dissuade any sympathizers from engaging in violence. One means is the Jordanian Unit to Combat Violent Religious Extremism and Terrorism. Working with the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Higher Education, its aim is the development of a curriculum promoting an "Islam of the Middle Way", while also assisting the Jordanian Ministry of Religious Endowments in hiring new preachers, imams, and muezzins. Indeed, the assistance provided to the Ministry of Religious Endowments was a direct consequence of the "harder" measures implemented by Jordanian authorities, according to Sharafat, a former General Intelligence Department officer, as the dismissal of radical preachers had caused the shortage of 3.300 imams and 700 muezzins in the country. This was particularly the case in cities where a proliferation of radical (takfiri)

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preachers had occurred such as Maan, Zarqa, Rusayfa, Irbid, Salt, and Kerak.[56]

Jordanian authorities also instrumentalize traditional societal patterns by applying discreet pressures on the family, kin, and clan of individuals suspected of being affiliated with salafi-jihadi environments to pressure "their" jihadists to repent or, at least, request kinship groups to formally condemn their "bad apples". The tribe of al-Zarqawi, for example, the Khalayla-Bani Hassan, issued a petition on November 20, 2005, condemning him for the bombings of three hotels in Amman, signed by his brother Sayel Fadel Nazzal al-Khalayla. There is, consequently, intended to be a significant social cost of turning to violent extremism in a society in which tribalism still persists.

Still, as noted, a significant number of Jordanians have joined salafi-jihadi groups abroad, and Jordanian authorities have attempted to facilitate dialogue between Jordanian religious scholars and returnees from the Syrian and Iraqi civil-war through the Community Peace Center, which was established in 2015. These returnees are categorized in three groups: i) those whose violent extremist mindset is deeply rooted and thus hard to counter, ii) those whose thoughts are extreme but can be countered, and iii) those who are least extreme and can easily be countered.[57]

Last, like the Jordanian tribe, Jordanian authorities have also instrumentalized jihadi ideologues such as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and Abu Qatada al-Filastini, who were freed from prison only to be put in house arrest in 2015. Still active on social networks and giving interviews to journalists and researchers, al-Maqdisi used this newly gained freedom to publicly condemn the excessive violence of his former comrade in arms, al-Zarqawi, although the former still adhered to a strict salafi interpretation of Islam and did not cut his ties to al-Qaida leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Later, al-Maqdisi called for all jihadists to split from IS and pleaded the IS leader al-Baghdadi to spare the life of the aforementioned pilot Mu'adh al-Kasasba. While the newly-found "moderate" attitude of al-Maqdisi certainly cost him the support of the most radical Jordanian jihadists, it did contribute to a decline in jihadi fervor as there are few jihadist theoreticians with greater religious credentials.[58] This is at least how al-Maqdisi is viewed by Jordanian authorities; if not, then he would necessarily have been silenced, and although they do not publicly acknowledge such a policy, it is nevertheless clear that "deconstructing" the jihadi discourse from the inside is seen as part of a broader policy of offering an alternative religious discourse against offensive jihadism.

If anything, al-Maqdisi, al-Filastini, and Iyab al-Qunaybi have become important 'honeypots' for the Jordanian authorities, as Jordanian security apparatuses instrumentalize these jihadi theoreticians' social media pages to identify supporters. As such, a simple "like" on a Facebook page, for example, could lead to "five years imprisonment".[59] One young Jordanian, for example, was sentenced to 15 years for having downloaded and forwarded a decapitation video by the Islamic State, which means Jordanian authorities penalize the intentions of jihadist actions, and not only the actions themselves.[60]

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[56] Al-Sharafat, "Tuqīm al-istrātījiyya al-waṭaniyya."

[57] Mohammed Abu Dalhoum, Duran Delgadillo, Hamza Elanfassi & Shannon Walker, "Deradicalization of Returnees to Jordan and Morocco: Limitations, Strengths, and Lessons for the Region," *IMES Capstone Paper Series* (Washington DC: Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, 2020), 13.

[58] For an Interview of Maqdisi see Hélène Sallon, "Abou Mohammed al-Maqdissi, un théoricien du djihad contre l'organisation Etat islamique," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, September 26, 2016, https://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2016/09/23/abou-mohamed-al-maqdisi-un-theoricien-du-djihad-contre-l-organisation-etat-islamique_5002200_3218.html; Tore Hamming, *Jihadi Politics: The Global Civil War, 2014-2019* (London: Hurst & Company, 2022).

[59] Abu Dalhoum et al., "Deradicalization of Returnees to Jordan and Morocco," 29.

[60] Lawyer of the young Jordanian, interview with Myriam Ababsa, October 13, 2021, Amman.

There are indications that the Jordanian approach contributes to the non-occurrence of violent extremism in Jordan despite the heavy presence of enabling environments in the Kingdom. For example, there is a clear ambivalence and reservation in the Jordanian public opinion about salafi-jihadism in general and violent extremism in particular. While some terrorist actions are perceived as more or less legitimate, others spark strong negative reactions from the public (the former pertains particularly to Palestinian attacks against Israel given the strong presence of a Palestinian demographic in the country). As such, al-Qaida and IS have attempted to capitalize on this model of a perceived "good terrorism" in order to justify their attacks against civilians. The Jordanian Christian journalist, Nahed Hattar, was for example assassinated by IS in front of an Amman court for having published a cartoon perceived as offensive to Islam.[61] According to Speckard, the number of death threats Hattar received indicates how IS propaganda entered Jordanian public discourse.[62] This nevertheless changed with the execution of al-Kasasba as Jordanian popular support for violent extremist groups decreased from 7 percent to 3 percent.[63]

5.3 Summary

There is no doubt that there are Jordanian enabling environments in which Jordanian youth are conducive to engaging in violent extremism in general and salafi-jihadism in particular. These enabling environments are created by deteriorating social, economic, and political conditions – accelerated by prevailing corruption and economic recession. It is thus unsurprising that the Jordanian contingent in the Syrian and Iraqi civil wars is as big as it is. What is surprising, however, is that Jordanian jihadism is mainly an export article which, so far, has not spilled over into home territory.

We have argued that the non-occurrence of violent extremism in Jordan is caused by Jordanian authorities' combination of hard and soft counter-extremism programs. By promoting an "Official Moderate Islam", the Jordanian government is attempting to create a religious counter-discourse in order to delegitimize extremists, in combination with the sanctioning of radical preachers, imams, and muezzins. In addition, the instrumentalization of kinship, clan, and family by the Jordanian state entails a considerable social cost to engaging in violent extremism. Thus far, this had prevented a considerable part of the Jordanian people in taking the final step, despite the hardening of popular Jordanian religious sentiments the last three decades.

6. Factors shaping the non-occurrence of violent extremism in the eastern countryside of Deir Ez-Zor, Syria

6.1 The case

Deir Ez-Zor remains one of the poorest Syrian regions and its population of approximately 1.6 million is one of the least educated.[64] Inhabited by two main tribal groups, the Ageidat and

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[61] Aljazeera, "Jordan: Nahed Hattar Shot Dead Ahead of Cartoon Trial," Aljazeera, September 26, 2016, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/9/26/jordan-nahed-hattar-shot-dead-ahead-of-cartoon-trial.
[62] Anne Speckhard, "The Jihad in Jordan: Drivers of Radicalization into Violent Extremism in Jordan," *The International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE)*, March 25, 2017, https://www.icsve.org/the-jihad-in-jordan-drivers-of-radicalization-into-violent-extremism-in-jordan.
[63] Speckhard, "The Jihad in Jordan."
[64] Heba El Laithy & Khalid Abu-Ismail, "Poverty in Syria: 1996-2004. Diagnosis and Pro-Poor Policy Considerations," *United Nations Development Programme*, June, 2005, https://www.undp.org/content/dam/rbas/report/PovertInSyriaEnglishVersion.pdf.

Baggara, late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and, subsequently, his son, Bashar al-Assad, instrumentalized the tribes of Deir Ez-Zor for their own political and economic gains. Hafez, for example, employed the tribes against his fight against the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in the 1980s, while his son sought their support when challenged. Still, the tribes of Deir Ez-Zor were largely left to themselves in cases of internal land disputes or cases of violent crime and had to deal with them through their own judicial proceedings or through tribally sanctioned violence.[65]

Despite the withdrawal of Syrian central authority from Deir Ez-Zor in 2012, the political role of the tribes did not cease. Not only were the tribes well-armed, but they also had a history of, and experience with, exercising violence – either through local dispute resolution or from the hundreds of tribesmen who had travelled to fight in Iraq following the US invasion in 2003 where many of them joined salafi-jihadist groups. As such, as each tribe of the region looked out for their own interests, Deir Ez-Zor became an enabling environment for violent extremism in which new, local forces sought to instrumentalize the tribal dynamics for their own ends. Undoubtedly, the tribes of Deir Ez-Zor were far from irrelevant with the chaos and violence of the Syrian civil-war.

This section analyzes how marginalization and violence enabled the rise of the jihadist environment in Deir Ez-Zor, with a particular focus on the eastern countryside of al-Jazira. As the greatest oil and gas reserves of Deir Ez-Zor are found here, al-Jazira became an attractive target for violent extremist groups who sought access to, and revenues from, these resources. As the presence of gas and oil had triggered inter-tribal competition and violent conflicts, jihadist and local tribes developed a symbiotic relationship through which each side tried to exploit the other. The jihadists, on the one hand, instrumentalized the tribal dynamics of Deir Ez-Zor to mobilize support for their cause, while local, tribal groups, on the other, instrumentalized their affiliation with the jihadists to exact revenge against their enemies, receive protection from the violence of competing tribes, and secure their own access to the oil resources and -revenues. Still, while several villages in Deir Ez-Zor sought jihadi affiliation to reach their own politico-economic goals, one particular village – Swedan – did not. This begs the question: What decisive moments caused this rare non-occurrence of violent extremism in Deir Ez-Zor?

6.2 The background

When the demands for democracy spread to Syria with the eruption of the Arab Spring, most rural tribes of Deir Ez-Zor were not immediately attracted to them. Instead, demonstrations were limited to the city of Deir Ez-Zor, as well as urban centers in the region known locally as the *Shāmiyya*, that is, west of the Euphrates River, including Muhasan, Quriyah and Bukamal. Tayyana, a town in the al-Jazira, was the main exception to the rule. The militarization of the uprising would change this dynamic, when the extreme violence of the Syrian regime prompted Syrians to form armed groups committed to resisting under the banner of the Free Syrian Army (FSA). By mid-2012, rebels in Deir Ez-Zor had managed to force the regime forces to largely withdraw from the province, although they still controlled the military airport and a few neighborhoods in the city.

Still, with centralized power eroding in Deir Ez-Zor, the FSA and opposition-affiliated groups failed to govern and secure the region. The resulting void of authority encouraged armed groups to seize control of oil and gas wells, most of which were located in tribal territories

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[65] Rami Al-Mnadi, "al-Qaḍāʾ al-ʿAshāʾirī fī Dayr al-Zūr" (Doha, Istanbul: Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies, 2021), 11.

belonging to the aforementioned Ageidat. The control over the region's oil was largely determined by a family, or group of families from a specific tribe, claiming ownership of a well in the nearby desert as an extension of their land. Consequently, by early 2013, the majority of oil and gas wells were controlled by tribal groups – either by tribal armed groups operating under the FSA banner or acting independently.

The seizure of oil wells – and the unequal distribution of wealth along tribal lines that derived from them – triggered violent conflicts among the Ageidat tribes who armed themselves to protect their newly appropriated oil wells. Indeed, this caused a local arms race as the tribes who had not joined, and been armed by, the FSA were forced to procure weapons themselves. As one tribal leader explained: "There are a lot of sleeping conflicts between tribes, and who knows what will happen! It is not smart to keep your arms folded while your neighbors are buying guns."[66]

The Syrian uprising and the withdrawal of the Syrian regime from Deir Ez-Zor thus ushered in a series of decisive moments for the occurrence of violent extremism in the region; facilitating the emergence of an enabling environment in which the rise of extremist groups was not a question of if, but of when. The al-Qaida-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra, for example, had long aspired to control the eastern countryside of al-Jazira. During this time, Jabhat al-Nusra forged alliances with military factions from the Shaitat, Bukamal, and Gur'an clans, although avoiding violent confrontations with other tribes and limited itself to appeal to tribes to hand over their oil resources to the newly established Sharia Committee for the 'fair distribution of oil'. Then, in September 2013, the Sharia Committee of Jabhat al-Nusra launched a military campaign to seize the oil and gas resources in tribal possession – taking advantage of the growing popular frustration over the chaos brought on by conflicts, as well as the pollution caused by the primitive oil refineries set up in the various villages in the eastern countryside and the recurring power outages caused by competing tribal groups sabotaging gas lines.

Most importantly, this campaign constituted a decisive moment in the way the jihadist group instrumentalized local tribal conflicts in its favor. In fact, it was common for locals in Deir Ez-Zor to refer to Jabhat al-Nusra as the al-Shayl Front or even the Buchamil Front because of the disproportionate influence that these tribes enjoyed within Jabhat al-Nusra. Rather than being viewed as a strict ideological jihadist group, Jabhat al-Nusra was instead perceived by the local population as a tribal faction. The selectivity of Nusra's campaign strengthened this feeling, as it avoided violent confrontation with the Buchamil tribe and instead focused on the resources of competing tribes.

These tribal divisions were one of the main factors facilitating the subsequent rise of IS in eastern Syria, who took control of Deir Ez-Zor in mid-2014 after eight months of sustained fighting against Jabhat al-Nusra. Still, IS remained a small faction in need of a local incubator in Deir Ez-Zor to act as the group's main representative and enforcer in the region. This role was carried out by a small armed group led by one Amir al-Rafdan, who belonged to the Mishrif of the Bkair tribe in the village Jadid Ageidat. Having joined Jabhat al-Nusra in mid-2013 and becoming responsible for the jihadist group's grain silos, al-Rafdan became politically isolated following a dispute with another al-Nusra-affiliated tribe, the Buchamil. Al-Rafdan's transfer to IS was thus symptomatic for the group's rise as the support IS enjoyed in Deir Ez-Zor was initially caused by the perceived tyranny of the Buchamil and the unfair distribution of oil resources.

These two factors – grievances caused by the endeavor of Buchamil and resource control – pushed tribes to align with IS across the eastern countryside. When Jabhat al-Nusra

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[66] Tribal leader from Tayyana, interview with Ahmad Mhidi, Tayyana, September 2021.

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cracked down on the city of Busayra in late-2013 to apprehend two ISIS affiliates, for example, fellow Bkayr tribesmen of the Gubaisa sub-tribe from the city offered armed support, killing the assailants from Buchamil. This triggered a massive reaction from Jabhat al-Nusra, which besieged and bombed Busayra. Yet, most important, as the former-al-Nusra-turned-IS commander al-Rafdan was quick to support Busayra with men and weapons when the city faced the revenge from al-Nusra, Busayra now turned to IS. Yet, this alignment with IS was never based on ideological tenets, but rather with al-Rafdan against the Buchamil of Jabhat al-Nusra. Similarly, Zirr was another village who was denied access to oil resources because of how Buchamil treated its neighbors. While the leader of Zirr, Abu Dujana, had switched its affiliations with armed groups according to its needs – from the FSA to Jabhat al-Nusra – it now joined IS in mid-2013. Still, this was largely a tactical support for IS, as few of the village tribes harbored ideological sympathies for the group. Still, in February 2014, when Jabhat al-Nusra cracked down on residents in the village, causing a number of casualties from the Bu Ezzedin tribe, a significant number of tribesmen were pushed to join the future IS leader, Abu Dujana of Zirr.

In a sense, IS succeeded in Deir Ez-Zor because it reversed the mistakes of Jabhat al-Nusra. Combined with brutal violence and the forcible displacement of entire villages, IS worked to strengthen ideological identity at the expense of that with the tribe. Their monopoly of violence hampered criminal activity and put an end to the persisting chaos, which was welcomed by the civilian population. Small tribes who had been marginalized due to their lack of power and influence were now protected from the coercion and violence of the stronger tribes. Ideology, economic incentives, and chaos drove the tribes to join IS.

Still, one particular village, Swedan, remained resilient in front of the so-called Caliphate and provides one particularly apt example of the non-occurrence of violent extremism in the eastern countryside of Syria. This is where we turn in the next section.

6.3 Factors contributing to the non-occurrence of violent extremism

Social ties, tribal solidarity, and an unfair distribution of resources were factors causing tribesmen to join jihadist groups. Indeed, in the period when IS controlled Deir Ez-Zor, there were hardly any tribes who did not join the organization in notable numbers. Only a few of them were resilient to the pressure from IS, of which Swedan is one such example. This begs the question: What caused Swedan to differ from the other tribes of Deir Ez-Zor? In this section, we provide two examples to illustrate the non-occurrence of violent extremism,

Located approximately 70 kilometers southeast of the city Deir Ez-Zor and with a population of 20.000, Swedan is dominated by the Bu Hasan tribe, which historically led a tribal coalition consisting of itself, the Gur'an and the Burhama on both sides of the Euphrates. Considered wealthy due to the remittances sent from family members working in the Gulf, its members were relatively well educated and with a number of doctors and engineers in the tribe.[67] These riches were similarly reflected in multi-story villages, real estate acquired in urban areas, and with a comparably low percentage of tribesmen working in agriculture. It is, then, illustrative that the neighbors of Swedan simply referred to it as the Dubai of the eastern countryside.

Swedan was thus not facing any severe economic hardship when the Syrian uprising erupted, and its participation in the popular demonstrations were limited to just dozens young men who travelled to other towns in the region because they were prevented from doing so at home. The notables of Swedan were, in other words, highly skeptical of the protests because of

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[67] Teacher from Swedan, interview with Ahmad Mhidi, Swedan, September 2021.

fear that regime retaliations would threaten the status quo of the community – making other tribes label the town as 'pro-regime'.[68] Yet, when the Syrian regime withdrew from Deir Ez-Zor, Swedan suddenly found itself surrounded by other tribes that were now armed, in possession of oil wells, and were engaging in brutal violence to protect and secure their interests. Further, a small group of tribesmen from Swedan joined an FSA brigade, which by early-2013 controlled one of the oil wells in the desert extension of Swedan.

Despite the frustration among many that the group controlled the oil well, no conflict was triggered between the families of Swedan as had happened elsewhere in Deir Ez-Zor. In fact, when a family from Jurthi, a neighboring village, attacked the oil well claiming it belonged to them and not Swedan, a deadly confrontation developed between the Swedan militants and Jurthi families. Still, as this first example of non-occurrence shows, although Jurthi was the aggressor in this case, and despite the call for the rest of the village to help them, Swedan refused to engage in any conflict – thus contradicting tribal norms of in-group solidarity.

The second example of the non-occurrence of violent extremism is illustrated by the trajectory and rise of Ghassan al-Rakkad from Swedan, known otherwise as Abu Zubayr.[69] As a Swedan local who did not hail from an influential family, Abu Zubayr joined Jabhat al-Nusra in late-2012 and rose to become judge, and then the head of the Deir Ez-Zor City branch of Jabhat al-Nusra's aforementioned Sharia Committee. Yet, despite his rise and recognition within Jabhat al-Nusra, Abu Zubayr did not experience an elevated standing among the tribesmen of Swedan – unlike Amir al-Rafdan and Abu Dujana al-Zirr who joined IS. Abu Zubayr was instead unsuccessful in recruiting family members into the ranks of Jabhat al-Nusra, strengthening the group's tribal relations, or even establishing a group headquarter in Swedan as it did elsewhere in Deir Ez-Zor. When a close relative of his was asked why Jabhat al-Nusra failed to recruit from Swedan, he replied: "This is the wrong question. The correct question is why Abu Zubayr [who was from Swedan] joined Jabhat al-Nusra, because he is the exception."[70]

6.4 Summary

Affiliation with violent extremist groups offered tribesmen of Deir Ez-Zor across most of the eastern countryside of al-Jazira a channel to express tribal solidarity, to wit, a means to respond to violence with more violence. If members of a tribe had been subject to perceived injustice, then groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra or IS were effective vehicles to carry out revenge on behalf of their tribe. For Swedan, however, this disengagement from localized conflicts emerging with the rise of tribal armed groups and the struggle for oil resources and -revenues was notable. Even when facing aggression from neighbors such as Jurthi did the notables of Swedan refuse to support its own tribesmen as conflict intensified.

Swedan's economic prosperity and comparatively high levels of education certainly factored into its tribesmen's response toward political events. Still, the village's refusal to become involved in conflict – thus going against tribal norms of in-group solidarity – cannot be explained in economic terms alone, as Swedan was known as one of the most peaceful among the Bu Hasan before remittances from abroad boosted the standards of living there. Although more research is required to fully understand the tribal dynamics of Deir Ez-Zor and the non-occurrence of violent extremism there, part of the answer may have been provided by one of

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[68] Pro-opposition tribesmen from Swedan, interview with Ahmad Mhidi, *WhatsApp*, October 2021.

[69] Muhammad Shaman, "Kān ʿawnṭajī wa aṣbaḥ qāḍī," *ʿAyn al-Madīna*, November 7, 2015, https://ayn-almadina.com/details/2158/كان عونطجي وأصبح قاضي/ar.

[70] Close relative of Ghassan Rakkad, interview with Ahmad Mhidi, *WhatsApp*, October 2021.

Swedan's tribal leaders. As he noted in an interview, de-escalation was an inherited cultural norm which meant that disputes rarely caused violence so common among the other tribes. When he was asked why violent extremism did not occur in Swedan, one Swedan notable and close relative to the Jabhat al-Nusra-affiliated Ghassan Rakkad noted: "We did not need to ally with anyone to take revenge," then adding, "[and] we did not need the oil".[71]

7. Factors shaping the non-occurrence of violent extremism in Iraq

7.1 The case and the background
The Nineveh Province and Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) are co-located in northern Iraq, sharing borders of approximately 200 km along Sinjar, the Nineveh Plains, Sheikhan, and Mahkhmour. Both the Nineveh Province and the KRI are comparable in terms of population sizes, ethno-religious and sectarian diversity, history, geography, and political economy. However, these two regions and communities have produced two different environments following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Nineveh has, for example, become far more vulnerable to violent extremism than the KRI, which has demonstrated greater resilience among its local population. Although there are a number of factors present in the KRI that facilitate the creation of enabling environments – the corruption and mismanagement of the KRI leadership, for example[72] – the pull of religiously framed extremism appears weak compared to other adjacent regions.

We carry out a comparative analysis of the emergence and development of violent extremism in the Nineveh Province and the KRI, and we argue that the US invasion in 2003 was a decisive moment to understand the process of both its occurrence and its non-occurrence. The central argument of this paper is that we cannot understand the occurrence and non-occurrence of VE without understanding the various contextual aspects of the society, including socio-economic conditions, sects, religious practices and interpretations, state-society relations, political process and security structure. Through detailed evidence-based analysis, we demonstrate that violent extremism should be viewed within the overall structure of governance and identity.

7.2 Factors contributing to the non-occurrence of violent extremism
7.2.1 Violent extremism in the Nineveh Province
As noted in the section above on methodology, we carried out a survey with 121 people in the Nineveh Province, which was categorized in two distinct groups: i) Individuals in the Nineveh Province who are, or have been, in enabling environments, including those who have not engaged in violent extremism, and those who have witnessed violent extremism; and ii) individuals who have engaged in violent extremism, but have now abandoned this approach for whatever reason. In the Nineveh survey, men constituted 66 percent of the respondents (80 participants), while women constituted 34 % (41 participants).

The presence of violent extremism in the Nineveh Province is widely recognized by the respondents of the survey (Figure 1). For example, when asked about the type of extremism of which they were aware, 53% referred to religious extremism as the main form of violent extremism, whereas 34% also referred to "ethnic" extremism (Figure 2). Importantly, the

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[71] Swedan notable, interview with Ahmad Mhidi, Swedan, September 2019.
[72] See e.g. Kamaran Palani, "Youth Radicalization in Kurdistan: The Government Response," in *Youth Identity, Politics, and Change in Contemporary Kurdistan*, edited by Shivan Fazil and Bahar Baser (London: Transnational Press London, 2021), 223-235.

overwhelming majority of respondents believed that the prevailing ideological extremism would cause violence in Nineveh (Figure 3).

Figure 1: Is your community confronted with extremism?

- No 3%
- NA 1%
- DK 3%
- Yes 93%

Figure 2: What type of extremism is present in your community?

- DK 5%
- Left 8%
- Ethno-nationalism 34%
- Religious 53%

Figure 3: Is the prevailing extremism you mentioned, promoting violence?

DK
1%

No
5%

Yes
94%

This should not be too surprising considering how there are several conflicts – both past and current – that are associated with extremism in Nineveh, all of which have had sectarian or religious aspects, further accelerated by regional interference. Most of these conflicts predate the IS occupation of Nineveh from 2014. There is consequently a combination of drivers that creates the current breeding ground for extremism in the province. As such, our data shows that there is a surprisingly equal distribution of drivers to which the respondents in Nineveh reference. 23%, for example, referred to _poverty_, while 21% percent referred to the _lack of education_. A similar size of respondents highlighted instead to _the militarization of society_ and the spread of armed groups (20%), while 17% referred to _ideology_, as illustrated by Figure 4. Interestingly, only 10% of the respondents mentioned _religion_ as a factor driving people to support extremist groups in the governorate.

Figure 4: Why do people support such groups and actions?

The state is provoking them
8%

Militarization and the spread of armed groups
20%

Poverty
23%

Lack of employment
17%

Religious believes
10%

Lack of education
22%

Last, the majority of the survey respondents in Nineveh believe that negotiating with extremist groups will have no effect (26%) or even worsen the prevalence of violent extremism (22%), as the respondents believe that negotiation "will lend them legitimacy" (Figure 5).

Figure 5: What do you think of negotiating with extremist groups?

DK
24%

It can help alleviate violent extremism
20%

It will worsen violent extremism
22%

No effect
26%

Other
8%

Still, referring to i) limited access to education, ii) poverty, iii) the militarization of society, and iv) ideology and religion as drivers of violent extremism in the Nineveh Province, these factors nevertheless need to be historically contextualized:

Nineveh, with its capital Mosul, has traditionally been described as the "little Iraq" considering how the province is composed by many of the ethno-religious communities that are found across the country as a whole – including Christians, Yezidis, Kaka'is, and Sabean-Mandeans, in addition to Shia and Sunni Arabs, Kurds, Shabaks, and Turkmen. With Sunni Arabs comprising the overall majority, the Nineveh Province was viewed as a symbol of religious and communal cohesion. Today, however, Nineveh suffers from geopolitical conflicts, tensions between urban and rural areas, and, since 2017, the stigma of IS, which continues to haunt significant segments of the population. The governorate still suffers from intercommunal competition for hegemony, which encouraged the emergence of IS, as the organization took advantage of Sunni grievances, marginalization, and deprivation to gain legitimacy – ultimately enabling it to control territory, resources, and people.[73] The liberation of Nineveh from IS in 2017 did consequently not offer any solution to long-standing conflicts. Rather, the forces which have dominated post-IS Nineveh have played a prominent role in exacerbating conflicts, constraining attempts at building resilience against violent extremism.

The religiously, ethnically, and linguistically diverse population of Nineveh is thus threatened today by a growing marginalization and discrimination based on sect and ethnicity. The empowerment of certain groups, which since 2017 have dominated the local administration and are supported by armed militias, creates inequality as a selected few monopolize resources and power. The aforementioned minority Shabaks, for example, are highly armed and backed by the Shiite Popular Mobilization Units, while Christians have received generous international economic grants. The Sunni Arab majority has in contrast been marginalized once again, and suffers from the stigma of being associated with IS. The trust in governmental institutions is consequently the lowest among Sunni Arabs.[74] One of the main drivers of violent extremism in the region is consequently the _mistrust_ between the Nineveh's communities along with ethnic

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[73] Falih Abd al-Jabbar, *The Caliphate State* (Beirut, Doha: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2017), 36.

[74] See Social Inquiry and the United State Institute of Peace, "Conflict and Stabilization Monitoring Framework Rounds 1, 2 & 3," *Social Inquiry & United States Institute of Peace*, October, 2019, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5bbb4e4c29f2cc31b47ff50f/t/5e9c23770343e60e1d05a576/158729104027 0/USIP-Iraq-CSMF-Social-Inquiry-Analysis_Waves-1-3.pdf.

or religious exclusion and discrimination, which have restricted access to services and opportunities to specific groups. Correspondingly, in two surveys carried out by the Un Ponte Per and Mercy Corps, the majority of respondents rejected the idea of having families whose members were previously affiliated with IS return of their places of origin.[75]

This mistrust becomes a fertile ground for violent extremism in combination with *mismanagement* and *exclusionary policies* and the *violations of human rights, freedoms, and the rule of law*. Indeed, the Nineveh administration is still based on sectarian power-sharing and is characterized by discrimination on the basis of religion or ethnicity.[76] In addition, widespread and increasing corruption has been the main outcome of institutional weakness and poor governance over the years, and is itself a driver for further rivalry and conflict in the governorate.[77] As in other parts of Iraq, Nineveh's population expresses low confidence in their political representatives, while the majority of them also recognize that the continuation of the status quo may lead to new conflicts and tensions in the governorate, among many other undesirable outcomes.

Limited access to education, one of the drivers mentioned by the respondents, is another key area of concern,[78] as the defeat of IS was not accompanied by any reintegration of children into the Iraqi educational system. This is particularly evident in the camps where IS members' families have been held since the military defeat of the group, and with no access to proper education.[79] Lack of appropriate education, and the social opportunity to engage with children from other communities in school, make youth vulnerable to violent extremism.

Poverty and underdevelopment are also important drivers of violent extremism, and unemployment currently represents the top concern in Nineveh[80] where there has been a drastic reduction in domestic and foreign investment, a sharp decline in the gains of the workforce in the governorate, internal displacement from rural areas to major cities in search of safety (leading to the decline of agricultural production and traditional products), and overall insecurity. This comes in addition to the corruption channeled through a patronage system organized around key political parties which prevailed long before the rise of IS.

The militarization of society is another barrier to stabilization and peacebuilding in Nineveh, leading citizens to believe that security can only be provided by armed groups, which, in turn, represent a major challenge to the achievement of social cohesion in the governorate.[81] Perceptions towards armed militias affiliated with ethno-religious minorities are highly polarized. Existing studies on Nineveh show that the militarization of society is considered by the survey's respondents as the second factor that promotes violent extremism. In Nineveh, this militarization occurred in parallel to the fight against IS, with the emergence of various factions

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[75] Beza Tesfaye & Keith Proctor, "Investing in Iraq's Peace: How Good Governance Can Diminish Support for Violent Extremism," *Mercy Corps*, December, 2015, https://www.mercycorps.org/research-resources/iraq-peace-governance-extremism, 3; Karar Rifaat & Kamaran Palani, *Preventing Violent Extremism in Nineveh* (Erbil: Un Ponte Per, 2021), 23.

[76] Rifaat & Palani, *Preventing Violent Extremism in Nineveh*, 28.

[77] Dlawer Ala'Aldeen, "Decentralisation in Iraq: Process, Progress and a New Tailor-Made Model," *Middle East Research Institute*, MERI Policy Report (Erbil: Middle East Research Institute, 2020), 24.

[78] See Rifaat & Palani, *Preventing Violent Extremism in Nineveh*, 24-25.

[79] United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, "The Right to Education in Iraq," February, 2020, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/2020-02IraqRightEducationreport.pdf , 11.

[80] Ashish Kumar Sen, "Unemployment Replaces ISIS as Top Security Concern for Minorities in Iraq," *United States Institute of Peace*, June 22, 2021, https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/06/unemployment-replaces-isis-top-security-concern-minorities-iraq.

[81] Henriette Johansen, Kamaran Palani, Kristin Perry & Dlawer Ala'Aldeen, "Ninewa Plains and Western Ninewa: Sustainable Returns and Stabilization Efforts. Current Initiatives and Trends," *Middle East Research Institute*, MERI Policy Report (Erbil: Middle East Research Institute, 2020), 38

which were later consolidated after the liberation of Nineveh.[82] Although perceived differently by different communities and individuals in Nineveh, the emergence of these armed actors resulted in the militarization of ethno-religious minorities, a widening gap between and within communities, and the weakening of state authority and control in the province.

Figure 6: Are you satisfied with governmental and international aid toward your community?

As such, it is, perhaps, not too surprising that there is a high level of dissatisfaction with the governmental and international aid in Nineveh, the data reveals a high level of dissatisfaction in the fields of good governance, rule of law, security sector reform (Figure 20). This dissatisfaction is significant across all sectors, as only 17 out of 105 respondents voiced satisfaction with the humanitarian support in the province.

7.2.2 Violent extremism in the KRI

As noted in the section above on methodology, we carried out a survey with 166 people in the KRI, which was categorized in two distinct groups: i) Individuals in the Nineveh Province who are, or have been, in enabling environments, including those who have not engaged in violent extremism, and those who have witnessed violent extremism; and ii) individuals who have engaged in violent extremism, but have now abandoned this approach for whatever reason. In the KRI survey, men constituted 77 percent of the respondents (127 participants), while women constituted 23% (39 participants).

Unlike the neighboring region Nineveh analyzed above, the KRI has undergone a different transformation post-2003 in terms of security, economic, and political development. The Kurds welcomed the regime change in Baghdad, for example, and cooperated with the US and the new Iraqi authorities. In this period, the KRI witnessed an unprecedented degree of stability compared to the rest of Iraq and has been the Iraqi region proving greatest resilience to violent extremism. This was caused, first, by the US-led invasion in 2003 which offered opportunities for Kurdish administrative unification and, in addition, played a kingmaker role in Baghdad by occupying the posts of President and Minister of Foreign Affairs, mentioning

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[82] For an overview of the existing armed groups in Nineveh, see Kamaran Palani, Dlawer Ala'Aldeen & Susan Cersosimo, "Turkey and the European Union: Conflicting Policies and Opportunities for Cooperation Over Iraq, Syria and the Kurdish Political Actors," Policy Report (Erbil: Middle East Research Institute, 2018), 15-16.

just some. Consequently, while the majority of Sunni Arabs in Iraq, including the residents of the Nineveh Province, voted against the new Iraqi constitution, the Kurds voted in favor – thus demonstrating the two different political trajectories of the provinces. The Unification Accord between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in 2006 further stabilized the KRI as the Kurds spoke politically with one voice instead of turning against each other.[83]

Most important, the Kurdish Islamist parties, which previously engaged in violent confrontations with the Kurdish ruling parties, integrated into the new political process after 2003. The Islamic political parties disarmed their members and actively engaged in this process. As shown below (Figure 10), the majority of the Kurdish respondents believe that negotiating with extremist groups can succeed in demobilizing violent extremism and prevent others from joining violent extremist organizations. The success of reintegrating Islamists into the new political process after 2003 is thus a possible explanation to the non-occurrence of violent extremism in the KRI, as the Kurdish Islamists accepted the new political process and the first elections under the US-led occupation. Indeed, this was a significant shift – especially for the Kurdistan Islamic Group and the Kurdistan Islamic Movement, which were created with the sole purpose of acting as armed movements with jihad as an official part of their political manifesto. Certainly, the lack of popular support added to this development.

Still, the existence of extremism in Kurdish society is a fact that is widely shared by the survey respondents (Figure 7). However, unlike the preceding Nineveh respondents, the majority from the KRI believe that the prevailing extremism – which is religious (51%) or ethno-nationalist by nature (33%) (Figure 8) – will not cause violence (Figure 9).

Figure 7: Is your community confronted with extremism?

DK 3%
NA 0%
No 22%
Yes 75%

Figure 8: What type of extremism is present in your community?

Left 5%
DK 3%
Other 8%
Ethno-nationalism 33%
Religious 51%

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
[83] See e.g. Kurdistan Regional Government, "Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement," January 23, 2006, http://previous.cabinet.gov.krd/a/d.aspx?s=010000&l=12&a=8891.

Figure 9: Is the prevailing extremism you mentioned, promoting violence? (KRI)

DK
4%

No
34%

Yes
62%

Similarly, the KRI differs from the Nineveh province insofar as a far greater share of the respondents believe that negotiating with extremist group may have some positive effect (Figure 10).

Figure 10: What do you think of negotiating with extremist groups? (KRI)

DK
4%

NA
1%

No effect
28%

It can help
alleviate
violent
extremism
56%

It will worsen
violent
extremism
11%

The data collected for this research indicates that the majority of the respondents (59%) in Nineveh were unaware of field efforts and programs aimed at preventing violent extremism (see Figure 11), and do not consider the efforts as sufficient (Figure 12). Similarly, when the respondents were asked about their awareness of efforts in Kurdistan, 54% of them replied negatively (Figure 13). In the KRI, there is a positive attitude towards the scale of intervention and programs among the participants (Figure 14), and the majority of participants (52%) think that the magnitude of the peace and community cohesion programs and efforts is sufficient. In addition, 33% of participants believes these programs were generous.

Figure 11: Are you aware of programs in your community dedicated to prevent violent extremism? (Nineveh)

DK
11%

Yes
30%

No
59%

Figure 12: Based on your personal experience how do you describe the magnitude of this contribution to peace and social cohesion? (Nineveh)

DK
3%

Generous
6%

Sufficient
34%

Very weak
57%

Figure 13: Are you aware of programs in your community dedicated to prevent violent extremism? KRI)

DK
8%

Yes
38%

No
54%

Figure 14: Based on your personal experience how do you describe the magnitude of this contribution to peace and social cohesion? (KRI)

Very weak
12%

Generous
35%

Sufficient
53%

Asked about the organizations or countries involved in prevent violent extremism present in Nineveh, 48% mentioned the specific names of NGOs (mostly international), 29% mentioned the European Union (EU), and only 11% mentioned governmental and local organization (Figure 15). Among the international NGOs mentioned by survey respondents are Un Ponte Per, PAX Peace Organization, Malteser International, German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ), and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). In the case of Kurdistan, a greater number of respondents referred to the government (43%), followed by NGOs (25%) (Figure 16).

Figure 15: Are one of the organisations or countries involved in PVE present in your community? (Nineveh)

Government services or local organization
12%

NGO
48%

EU
29%

UN
2%

Germany
2%

US
7%

Figure 16: Are one of the organisations or countries involved in PVE present in your community? (KRI)

NGO
25%

Government services or local organization
43%

UN
11%

Germany
1%

US
6%

EU
14%

Regarding characterization of the programs and contribution to peace and social cohesion in Nineveh, respondents are divided. Of those interviewed, 32% stated that the contribution and programs in their governorate offered the right type of assistance, and 26% characterized the

support as 'well targeted – to right beneficiaries'. The same number of respondents considered the contribution to be 'wrong targeted - to wrong beneficiaries', and 16% regarded it as the wrong type (Figure 17). This is despite a widespread recognition that the organizations working on the prevention of violent extremism in Nineveh contributed to peace and community cohesion (Figure 18). A significant number (77%, of participants) believe that both local and international organizations working in the field of preventing violent extremism help to maintain peace and social cohesion in their governorate. Still, 18% of participants believed that the work of the preventing violent extremism-related programs and organizations in their community will not lead to peace and social cohesion.

Figure 17: Which of the following descriptions fits better with this contribution? (Nineveh)

Figure 18: Do you think that organisations working PVE in your community help to maintain peace and social cohesion? (Nineveh)

It is clear from the results in KRI that the efforts are perceived favorably by interviewees (Figure 19). Around 43% of the respondents thought that the type of the programs and their targeting was correctly implemented. 28% of those interviewed in the KRI stated that the support was the right type of assistance. However, 13% of the respondents believed that the contribution was 'wrongly targeted – to wrong beneficiaries', and fewer people considered the contribution to be a 'wrong type of assistance'. Furthermore, regarding the work of organizations working on PVE in KRI, 88% believed that the work of the organizations is helpful to maintain peace and social cohesion in their community (Figure 20).

Figure 19: Which of the following descriptions fits better with this contribution? (KRI)

NA 2%
Wrong type of assistance 3%
Other 2%
DK 9%
Wrong targeted - to wrong beneficiaries 13%
The right type of assistance 28%
Well targeted – to right beneficiaries 43%

Figure 20: Do you think that organisations working PVE in your community help to maintain peace and social cohesion? (KRI)

DK 6%
No 6%
Yes 88%

Last, contrary to the Nineveh Province, there are significant differences at the level of satisfaction in the sectors of economy, humanitarian rule of law, and good governance, and 63 out of 140 respondents were satisfied with governmental and international aid in their community (Figure 21).

Figure 21: Are you satisfied with governmental and international aid toward your community? (KRI)

Legend: Very satisfied · Satisfied · Not satisfied enough · Not satisfied at all · DK · NA

Sector	Very satisfied	Satisfied	Not satisfied enough	Not satisfied at all	DK	NA
Economic	2	15	41	80	2	
Humanitarian	7	37	25	70	1	
Rule of law	1	29	38	66	6	
Good Governance	3	25	36	69	7	
Security Sector Reform	15	63	42	17	4	

7.3 Summary

This section has employed the Nineveh Province as a case of the occurrence of violent extremism and the KRI as a case of the non-occurrence, and thus highlighted five possible answers to how violent extremism was prevented in the KRI post-2003. These answers should also be considered as policy priorities and elements for resilience and prevention of radicalization in the region. First, the absence of pull factors, such as the appeal of a particular charismatic Kurdish leader or group, or an ideology that can both reach deep into Kurdish society to promote extremist behavior. Second, the effectivity of the government's hard security measures in monitoring and countering terrorism, and the high level of cooperation between the

government security forces and the wider population. Third, the Kurds' historical attachment to their ethnic cause, which has been a bulwark against religious extremism, while promoting or justifying ethnic-based violence. This comes in combination with the Kurds' historic relationship with Islam, which has been largely affiliated with Sufism, which has made Kurdish areas more inclined to pluralism and tolerance.

Last, economic conditions improved considerably in the KRI post-2003 as they won their share of the national budget. This contributed to reducing unemployment rates to unprecedented lows, reducing emigration levels within the youth and improving education infrastructure in the region. However, since 2014, the KRG has become overwhelmed by financial problems, internal political rivalry, preventing youth radicalization, and violent extremism. As a result, key initiatives such as educational and religious reforms did not receive the warranted prioritization. Though people's adherence to Kurdayati (Kurdishness) and the dominant spiritual rather than politicized practices of religion among the Kurds create a degree of resilience against religious extremism, recent developments indicate a diminishing sense of Kurdayati among youth. Therefore, without comprehensive assessments and discussions regarding the prevention of VE among Kurdistan's youth, the factors fueling violence and extremism may increase in the future.

These factors were absent – or, at least, weaker – in the Nineveh Province, which struggled far more with violent extremism. Indeed, while trust towards the post-2003 political leadership was high in the KRI, it was low in Nineveh; while Islamist actors were included in the Kurdish political process and a sense of political unity prevailed, Nineveh experienced exclusionary policies and the violation of human rights; while the KRI experienced economic growth, the Nineveh Province experienced socio-economic deterioration from 2003 to 2017. These grievances in Nineveh were consequently instrumentalized by violent extremists for their own political causes.

8. Concluding remarks

This working paper has employed four cases of the non-occurrence of violent extremism in the Middle East: The disenfranchised youth of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordanian jihadism as an export article struggling to manifest itself in the home country, the Syria village Swedan in Deir Ez-Zor, and the Nineveh Province and the Kurdistan Region in Iraq (KRI).

The Egyptian case demonstrated that although a considerable segment of youth from the Muslim Brotherhood was radicalized – i.e., accepted the use of violence as a means of political change –, the majority did not join violent extremist organizations or carry out violence. As such, radicalization does not automatically lead to violence although the propensity increases, and support for violent extremism may more often than not be passive. If it is not possible to prevent a process of radicalization, then one should at least aim to pacify those undergoing this process. Two factors were particularly important for passive radicalization: the strength of perceived legitimate religious counter-voices and the great costs associated with engaging in violent extremism, either for yourself or for your family.

The Jordanian case, on the other hand, analyzed Jordanian jihadism as one of the country's greatest export articles, which, perhaps surprisingly, found itself in a state of asphyxiation at home. That is, while Jordan has been the home of some of the most important jihadist ideologues such as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi or Abu Qatada al-Filastini and has provided one of the largest contingents of foreign fighters to Afghanistan and Syria, there is nevertheless few cases of jihadist violence in Jordan itself. This non-occurrence of violent extremism is largely caused by the same factors highlighted in the Egyptian case: The impact of religious countercurrents through i) the instrumentalization of renowned jihadist ideologues

rejecting violence combined with the high costs associated with jihadism through ii) the instrumentalization of kinship and clan affiliation. As such, the Jordanian popular nationalist reaction to IS' execution of Muʿadh al-Kasasba is another ideological counter-current instrumentalized by the Jordanian regime as a bulwark against violent extremism. If anything, what makes the non-occurrence of violent extremism in Jordan differ from Egypt is the effect of hard counter-terrorism programs and heavy repression. This approach has been largely unsuccessful in Egypt in terms of deradicalization (although it may have demobilized large segments of the Egyptian population), yet one should be careful thinking this can succeed in Jordan in the long-term.

The Iraqi case compared the occurrence of violent extremism in the Nineveh Province with the non-occurrence of violent extremism in the KRI. Again, we see that an ideology capable of countering violent extremist thought matters as Kurdish nationalism has provided a bulwark preventing the spread of jihadism (like Jordanian nationalism did following the execution of Kasasba). Although constituting a largely passive factor latent in the Kurdish population, the Kurdish government has combined this historical resilience against jihadism with hard security measures in monitoring and counter terrorism thus increasing the costs associated with turning to violent extremism.

Last, the Syrian case of Swedan in Deir Ez-Zor is an outlier insofar as it has highlighted different factors causing the non-occurrence of violent extremism in an enabling environment. This should not be particularly surprising considering how the context of Swedan – the Syrian civil-war is – is itself an extreme. Mainly, Swedan has demonstrated that economic stability and security matters on the collective level to remain resilient against the allure and promises of violent extremist groups.

This working paper has identified several subfields for future research. The first pertains to the competition in which state-backed narratives, religious countercurrents, and violent extremists engage when they compete for ideological hegemony in local societies and in enabling environments. Authority seldom lies in *what we say*, but in terms of who we are, and most of all *what we represent*.[84] Before we can present a case, we must be recognized as legitimate in order to speak with authority.[85] Authority must consequently be constructed, or, conversely, the authority of ideological competitors must be *de*constructed. This has not been particularly difficult for violent extremists in the region considering authoritarian MENA regimes' heavy interference in religious affairs. Al-Qaida, for example, has traditionally framed opposing clerics as "either corrupt tools of the regime or fearful bystanders who hide the truth to protect themselves."[86] By accusing state-sponsored scholars who reside in the comfortable embrace of autocrats of not having experienced the battlefield and thus not knowing what they speak, salafi-jihadists challenge their authority to discuss the matter – or, at the very least, criticize those who do anything to change the status quo. Al-Qaida has consequently traditionally constructed its authority by framing itself as "experts by experience"[87] – or what

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[84] Stephen Hopgood, "Moral Authority, Modernity and the Politics of the Sacred," *European Journal of International Relations* 15, no. 2 (2009): 230.

[85] It is important to note that authority and legitimacy are not interchangeable, as the former is " … a claim for compliance, while [legitimacy] is an acceptance of that claim." Norman Uphoff, "Distinguishing Power, Authority & Legitimacy: Taking Max Weber at His Words by Using Resource-Exchange Analysis," *Polity* 22, no. 2 (1989): 300-301.

[86] Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Framing Jihad: Intramovement Framing Contests and al-Qaida's Struggle for Sacred Authority," *International Review of Social History*, 49 (2004): 173.

[87] Leila Dawney, "The figure of authority: the affective biopolitics of the mother and the dying man," *Journal of Political Power* 6, no. 1 (2013): 32.

Zagzebski terms "epistemic authority".[88] This begs the question: What dynamics determine the success of religious countercurrents' bid for legitimacy in enabling environments?

The second sub-field pertains to the political economy of violent extremism as a form of protest ideology and a vehicle of economic warfare. As economic classes may emerge from, or alongside, status groups like tribal shaykhs, sayyids (descendants of the Prophet Muhammad), or religious scholars,[89] it appears that local antagonisms, identities, and solidarities may drive armed Islamist groups more than ideology alone.[90] Violent extremism in general and salafi-jihadism in particular provide young disenfranchised men the means to overturn existing social hierarchies and to become local chiefs, community leaders, and religious judges despite being born outside the aforementioned status groups.[91] Consequently, how do the specific forms of MENA capitalism contribute to, and influence, contemporary violent extremism in the region and the local resilience against it?

8.1 Preventive measures

Our findings have several policy implications. This study has underlined three main factors that shape youth decision to take up arms or not. Drawing a successful PVE strategy need to focus on these three factors to prevent already radicalized youth from taking up arms. While radicalization is a social phenomenon shaped by structural political and socio-economic factors, taking up arms is an individual decision and is shaped by personal factors such as religious convictions combined with the personal understanding of the costs associated with this decision for both him/her and his/her family.

Ideology matters: Although socio-economic and political grievances are drivers of violent extremism, the decisive moment of turning to violence relies on an ideological framework translating the acceptance of violence to the act of violence. Preventing violent extremism requires, first, the creation of an ideological counter-current that can compete on the level of ideas against the jihadist trends, and, second, voices perceived as legitimate that act as trustworthy proponents of these countercurrents. Certainly, a number of religious scholars have attempted to refute jihadist ideology in general and ideas of excommunication (*takfīr*) and jihad in particular, but they often lack the religious and ideological legitimacy in the eyes of radicalized youth – unlike jihadist ideologists and militants such as Abdallah Azzam and Usama bin Ladin. Indeed, most often, they are perceived as mouthpieces of autocratic regimes. Religious countercurrents must thus be independent from the state institutions against which radicalized youth rebel. Essentially, while MENA regimes have called for religious reform, what is needed is the reform of Islam-state relations. As such, the KRI may be an example of how such relations may look like should one be successful in such an endeavor. It is uncertain, however, if one can simply engineer such complex societal dynamics – at least in the short- or mid-term.

Material and social costs matters: The Egyptian, Jordanian, Syrian, and the Iraqi cases show that high costs associated with violent extremism matter. All relevant MENA states have done so through various means – although relentless military repression is shared by all. As the

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[88] Linda Zagzebski, *Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 6.

[89] Joel Beinin, "Introduction," in *A Critical Political Economy of the Middle East and North Africa*, edited by Joel Beinin, Bassam Haddad, and Sherene Seikaly (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2021), 3.

[90] Raphaël Lefèvre, *Jihad in the City: Militant Islamism and Contentious Politics in Tripoli* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 6.

[91] Bernard Rougier, *The Sunni Tragedy in the Middle East: Northern Lebanon from al-Qaeda to ISIS* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 237.

Egyptian case illustrated, the firm response against any protest currents, the Egyptian regime has managed to plant seeds of doubts on the feasibility of armed action considering the imbalance between those desiring an insurgency and the well-funded and trained security agencies. The same applies to the KRI in Iraq, which has combined the ideological factor with military means to suppress violent extremist organizations. The Jordanian case is interesting because it shows how costs do not necessarily equal physical harm, but also social exclusion. By instrumentalizing Jordanian tribal structures and norms, there are associated costs with violent extremism as one face the possibility of being publicly condemned and rejected by one's own.

Good governance, democratic inclusion, and economy matter: All cases confirm implicitly or explicitly that good governance and political inclusion matters. It matters implicitly in the Egyptian case insofar as the ouster of Egyptian President Muhammad Mursi was a triggering moment causing the commencement of a radicalization process for a segment of Muslim Brotherhood youth. It matters explicitly in the Iraqi case insofar as good governance and the political inclusion of armed Islamist Kurdish actors contributed to the non-occurrence of violent extremism. Undoubtedly, as authoritarianism and corruption are two of the main drivers of violent extremism in the Middle East, dealing with these issues will necessarily be one of the most important preventive measures in the region. Further, as the Jordanian case demonstrates, unhinged capitalist exploitation with a corresponding deterioration of living standards for the majority will necessarily create enabling environments where violent extremist ideologies are prepared to instrumentalize such grievances. It is consequently not sufficient to implement democracy if people struggle to survive and the dynamic between capital and labor must necessarily be altered at the expense of the former.

8.2 What does this mean for PvE policies?

Hard counter-terrorism measures have contributed to the non-occurrence of violent extremism in the Middle East. Yet, this is only a short-term solution and cannot solve the underlying political, social, and economic grievances facilitating enabling environments in which decisive moments must occur over time. A set of conditions thus need to be fulfilled to create and maintain resilience against violent extremism. In this working paper, we have referred to the legitimate ideological countercurrents, high costs associated with violent extremism, and good governance and democratic inclusion. Alleviating social grievances are of equal importance as democratic processes are of little help for those struggling to make ends meet.

This working paper has highlighted a persisting blind spot in the existing scholarship and research on violent extremism. Although this research has been pioneering in its own right, the sole focus on the *occurrence* of violent extremism has often meant that scholars and policy makers have concerned themselves with the minutiae of the problem to such an extent that one often overlooks the situation as a whole (one cannot see the forest for the trees). While there for decades has been a thorough and expansive scholarly discussion about *what* the decisive drivers of violent extremism are, it may be more fruitful to discuss how these drivers affect various population segments differently and why they do so. The majority in enabling environments *do not* engage in violent extremism, and many of those who undergo a process of radicalization do not join violent extremist groups either.

This has important implications for PvE and CT policies in the region. By focusing solely on the drivers of violent extremism (what goes wrong), one has traditionally missed what goes right and why it does so. The PvE and CT policies of MENA regimes have consequently been reactive instead of preventive – without the required macro-structural reforms to change the status quo and the mushrooming of new enabling environments. As such, one should be

careful not securitizing target populations perceived as particularly prone to terrorism and violent extremism by implementing PvE programs indiscriminately in enabling environments (justified by the rationale that this is, in fact, where violent extremism *occurs*). Specifically, one should avoid targeting specific ethnic and religious groups and transform them from political subjects expressing legitimate grievances to security issues[92] that receive disproportionate attention through a geographical clustering of national and international PvE and CT programs. Securitization may cause alienation and cognitive dissonance on the ground as whole segments in enabling environments are defined as a "problem" for the rest of the population or the international community.

For example, most of the EU PvE projects focusing on societal cohesion in Lebanon are organized in localities with a Sunni majority – with the associated possibility of stigma against specific religious groupings. This could potentially heighten sectarian tensions in a country where "the [Lebanese] army's main mission has been to fight against Sunni jihadi groups", with a number of associated questions about Hezbollah's influence over the military.[93] A unidirectional focus is similarly risky in other countries such as Iraq where Iraqi Shiite militias are not just military actors, but also political players with offices in government, parliament, and local Iraqi politics.[94]

Research on the drivers of *non-occurrence* is still in its infancy; we do still not fully understand why the majority in enabling environments do not engage in violent extremism despite experiencing many, if not all, of the same grievances. Studying the non-occurrence of violent extremism – and focusing on the resilience of local communities and their experiences – are thus fruitful precisely because it enables us to move from framing a target population as "part of the problem" to potentially being "part of the solution".

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[92] Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 25-26.

[93] Tine Gade and Nayla Moussa, 'The Lebanese army after the Syrian crisis: Alienating the Sunni Community?', in Are John Knudsen and Tine Gade (eds), *Civil-military relations in Lebanon: Conflict, cohesion, and confessionalism in a divided society* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 41-42.

[94] Norman Cigar, *Iraq's Shia warlords and their militias: Political and security challenges and options* (Carlisle Barracks: United States Army War College Press, 2015), 18-20.

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
Appendix B: Interview guides

English questionnaire for the case of Iraq

PREVEX		
MO1	Questionnaire number	|__|__|__|__|__|__|
MO2	Interview Date	|__|__|-|__|__|-|__|__|
MO3	Surveyor Code	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
MO4	Place of interview	_____
MO5	Interview start (time)	|__|__|:|__|__|
MO6	interview end (time)	|__|__|:|__|__|
Demographic and socioprofessional Profile		
DE1	Gender	M 1 F 2
DE2	Age	18-25 1 26-39 2 40-60 3 60+ 4
DE3	What is your nationality?	Iraqi 1 Other 2 DK 3 NA 8	
DE4	Where do you live? District & City _____	1 2 DK 8 NA 9	

DE5	What is your religion?		Sunni Islam	1	
			Shia Islam	2	
			Christian	3	
			Yazidi	4	
			Kakai	5	
			Shabak	6	
			Shabian-Mandean	7	
			Bahai	10	
			Zoroastrian	11	
			No religion	12	
			Other	13	
			DK	8	
			NA	9	
DE7	To what ethnic group to you belong?	Arab	1		
		Kurd	2		
		Turkman	3		
		Chaldo-Assyrian	4		
		Other	5		
		DK	8		
		NA	9		
DE8	For how many years have you attended school?		None	1	
			3-5	2	
			6-7	3	
			8-11	4	
			12-13	5	
			14-16	6	
			17-20	7	
			DK	8	
			NA	9	
DE9	Can you read a letter or newspaper?		Yes, easily	1	
			Yes, but with difficulties	2	
			No	3	
			DK	8	
			NA	9	
DE10	Can write a letter and other documents?		Yes, easily	1	
			Yes, but with difficulties	2	
			No	3	
			DK	8	
			NA	9	
DE11	How are you financially speaking?		Very poor	1	
			Under the median	2	
			Median	3	
			More than the median	4	
			Very well	5	
			DK	8	
			NA	9	

DE12	How many meals do you have daily?		One/daily	1	
			Two/daily/daily	2	
			Three/daily	3	
			More than three	4	
			DK	8	
			NA	9	

Violent Extremism

SJ1	Is your community confronted with extremism?		Yes	1	if **1** ☐ go to **SJ2**
			No	2	
			DK	8	IF **2, 8, 9** Skip to H1
			NA	9	

SJ2	What type of extremism is present in your community?		Religious	1	
			Ethno-nationalism	2	
			Left-wing	3	
			Separatist	4	
			DK	8	
			NA	9	

SJ3	Is the prevailing extremism you mentioned, promoting violence?	*1 Yes; 2 No; 8 DK; 9 NA, If Yes, go to SJ4, if no, skip to P1*		
			1 Yes; 2 No; 8 DK; 9 NA	

SJ4	Why do people support such groups and actions?		Poverty	1
			Religious believes	2
			Lack of education	3
			Lack of employment	4
			Militarization and the spread of armed groups	5
			The state is provoking them	6
			Other (please specify)	7
			DK	8
			NA	9

SJ5	In your community, who has the tendency to defend such opinions?	1 Yes; 2 No; 8 DK; 9 NA			
		Unemployed youth	1	2 8 9	
		Religious leaders	1	2 8 9	
		Elderly people	1	2 8 9	
		Community elite	1	2 8 9	
		Victims of state violence	1	2 8 9	
		Merchants, traders	1	2 8 9	
		women	1	2 8 9	

SJ6		*1 Very satisfied; 2 Satisfied; 3 Not satisfied enough; 4 Not satisfied at all; 8 DK; 9 NA*

	Are you satisfied with governmental and international aid toward your community?	Economic Humanitarian Rule of law Good Governance Security Sector Reform	1 2 3 4 8 9 1 2 3 4 8 9 1 2 3 4 8 9 1 2 3 4 8 9 1 2 3 4 8 9	

Personal experience with violent extremism prevention policies

PE1	Are you aware of programs in your community dedicated to prevent violent extremism?	Yes No DK NA	1 2 8 9	All answers excepted 1 ☐ go to GBV
PE2	Are one of the organizations or countries involved in PVE present in your community?	Government services or local organization EU UN Germany US Other countries (please specify) NGO (please specify) DK NA	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	If DK or NA go to GBV
PE3	Do you think that organizations working PVE in your community help to maintain peace and social cohesion?	Yes No DK NA	1 2 8 9	If DK or NA go to GBV
PE4	Based on your personal experience how do you describe the magnitude of this contribution to peace and social cohesion?	Generous Sufficient Very weak DK NA	1 2 3 8 9	If DK or NA go to GBV
PE5	Which of the following descriptions fits better with this contribution?	The right type of assistance Well targeted – to right beneficiaries Wrong targeted - to wrong beneficiaries Wrong type of assistance Made the situation worse Other_____ DK NA	 1 2 3 4 5 8 9	

General views on EU commitment in your country

GBV 1	Do you think that EU do understand where assistance and aid should be oriented?	Yes No DK NA	1 2 8 9	

GBV 2	What effect EU intervention do have in your community?	Help to alleviate violent extremism	1	
		worsening violent extremism	2	
		Not effect at all	3	
		Other_____	4	
		DK	8	
		NA	9	
GBV 3	Do you think that your situation is worse, better, or the same with EU intervention?	*1 better; 2 worse; 3 the same; 8 DK; 9 NA*		
		1 2 3 8 9		
H1	What do you think of negotiating with extremist groups?	It can help alleviate violent extremism	1	
		It will worsen violent extremism	2	
		No effect	3	
		Other _____	4	
		DK	8	
		NA	9	

Arabic questionnaire for the case of Iraq

			PREVEX
	|_|_|_|_|_|_|	رقم الاستبيان	MO 1
	|_|_|-|_|_|-|_|_|	تاريخ المقابلة	MO 2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8		رمز المساح	MO 3
	_____	مكان المقابلة	MO 4
	|_|_|:|_|_|	بدء المقابلة (الوقت)	MO 5
	|_|_|:|_|_|	نهاية المقابلة (الوقت)	MO 6
		الملف الديموغرافي والاجتماعي المهني	
1 2	ذكر / أنثى	جنس	DE1
1 2 3 4	18-25 / 26-39 / 40-60 / 60+	عمر	DE2
1 2 3	عراقي / آخر / لا أعرف / غير قابل للتطبيق	ما هي جنسيتك؟	DE3

			8

DE4	أين تعيش؟؟	المنطقة والمدينة _____	1
		لا أعرف	8
		غير قابل للتطبيق	9

DE5	ما هو دينك؟	الإسلام السني	1
		الإسلام الشيعي	2
		مسيحي	3
		اليزيدية	4
		كاكاي	5
		شبك	6
		سابيان منديان	7
		البهانيه	10
		زرادشتي	11
		لا دين	12
		آخر	13
		لا أعرف	8
		غير قابل للتطبيق	9

DE7	إلى أي مجموعة عرقية تنتمي؟	عربي	1	
		كردي	2	
		تركمان	3	
		الكلدو الآشوري	4	
		آخر	5	
		لا أعرف	8	
		غير قابل للتطبيق	9	

DE8	كم سنة التحقت بالمدرسة؟	لاشيء	1
		3-5	2
		6-7	3
		8-11	4
		12-13	5
		14-16	6
		17-20	7
		لا أعرف	8
		غير قابل للتطبيق	9

DE9	هل يمكنك قراءة رسالة أو صحيفة؟	نعم، بسهولة	1
		نعم، ولكن مع الصعوبات	2
		لا	3
		لا أعرف	8
		غير قابل للتطبيق	9

DE10	هل يمكن كتابة رسالة ووثائق أخرى؟	نعم، بسهولة	1
		نعم، ولكن مع الصعوبات	2
		لا	3
		لا أعرف	8
		غير قابل للتطبيق	9

| DE11 | كيف تتحدث ماليا؟ | فقير جدا | 1 |
| | | تحت الوسيط | 2 |

	الرموز	الإجابات	السؤال	
	3 4 5 8 9	متوسط أكثر من المتوسط موافق لا أعرف غير قابل للتطبيق		
	1 2 3 4 8 9	واحد / يوميا اثنين / يوميا / يوميا ثلاثة / يوميا أكثر من ثلاثة لا أعرف غير قابل للتطبيق	كم وجبة طعام تاكل يوميا؟	DE12

التطرف العنيف				

إذا كان 1 ⬜ الذهاب إلى **SJ2** لو 2، 8، 9 تخطي إلى H1	1 2 8 9	نعم لا لا أعرف غير قابل للتطبيق	هل يواجه مجتمعكم التطرف؟	SJ1
	1 2 3 8 9	ديني القومية العرقية الجناح-اليساري لا أعرف غير قابل للتطبيق	ما هو نوع التطرف الموجود في مجتمعك؟	SJ2
1نعم؛ 2 لا؛ 8 لا أعرف؛ 9 غير قابل للتطبيق، إذا كان نعم، انتقل إلىSJ4 ، إذا لم يكن، انتقل إلىP1 العنف؟ 1نعم؛ رقم 2؛8 لا أعرف 9؛ غير قابل للتطبيق			هل يشجع التطرف السائد العنف؟	SJ3
	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	فقر الأديان تعتقد نقص التعليم نقص فرص العمل عسكرة وانتشار الجماعات المسلحة الدولة تستفزهم أخرى (يرجى تحديد) لا أعرف غير قابل للتطبيق	لماذا يدعم الناس مثل هذه المجموعات والإجراءات؟	SJ4
1 نعم؛ 2 لا؛ 8 لا أعرف؛ 9 غير قابل للتطبيق 1 2 8 9 الشباب العاطلون عن العمل 1 2 8 9 الزعماء الدينيون 1 2 8 9 المسنون 1 2 8 9 النخبة المجتمعية 1 2 8 9 ضحايا عنف الدولة 1 2 8 9 التجار 1 2 8 9 نساء			في مجتمعك، من لديه ميل للدفاع عن مثل هذه الآراء؟	SJ5
1 راض جدا؛ 2 راض؛ 3 غير راض بما فيه الكفاية؛ 4 غير راض على الإطلاق؛8 لا				

		أعرف 9 ;غير قابل للتطبيق	هل أنت راض عن المساعدات الحكومية والدولية لمجتمعك؟	SJ6
	1 2 3 4 8 9	اقتصادي		
	1 2 3 4 8 9	إنساني		
	1 2 3 4 8 9	سيادة القانون		
	1 2 3 4 8 9	الحكم الرشيد		
	1 2 3 4 8 9	إصلاح قطاع الأمن		

تجربة شخصية مع سياسات منع التطرف العنيف

جميع الإجابات باستثناء 1 جميع الإجابات باستثناء 1 اذهب إلى GBV	1 2 8 9	نعم لا لا أعرف غير قابل للتطبيق	هل أنت على علم بالبرامج في مجتمعك المخصصة لمنع التطرف العنيف؟	PE1
إذا (لا أعرف) أو (غير قابل للتطبيق) انتقل إلى GBV	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	الخدمات الحكومية أو المنظمات المحلية الاتحاد الأوروبي ولايات متحدة ألمانيا ولايات متحدة أمريكية بلدان أخرى (يرجى تحديد) المنظمات غير الحكومية (يرجى تحديد) لا أعرف غير قابل للتطبيق	هل إحدى المنظمات أو البلدان المشاركة في برنامج منع التطرف العنيف موجودة في مجتمعك؟	PE2
إذا (لا أعرف) أو (غير قابل للتطبيق) انتقل إلى GBV	1 2 8 9	نعم لا لا أعرف غير قابل للتطبيق	هل تعتقد أن المنظمات العاملة في منع التطرف العنيف في مجتمعك تساعد على الحفاظ على السلام والتماسك الاجتماعي؟	PE3
إذا (لا أعرف) أو (غير قابل للتطبيق) انتقل إلى GBV	1 2 3 8 9	كريم كاف ضعيف جدا لا أعرف غير قابل للتطبيق	بناء على تجربتك الشخصية كيف تصف حجم هذه المساهمة في السلام والتماسك الاجتماعي؟	PE4
	1 2 3 4 5 6 8 9	النوع الصحيح من المساعدة موجهة بشكل جيد – للمستفيدين المناسبين استهداف خاطئ - للمستفيدين الخطأ نوع خاطئ من المساعدة جعل الوضع أسوأ آخر _____ لا أعرف غير قابل للتطبيق	أي من الأوصاف التالية يتناسب بشكل أفضل مع هذه المساهمة؟	PE5

وجهات نظر عامة حول التزام الاتحاد الأوروبي في بلدك

	1 2 8	نعم لا لا أعرف	هل تعتقد أن الاتحاد الأوروبي يفهم أين ينبغي توجيه المساعدات؟	GBV 1

	9	غير قابل للتطبيق	
GBV 2	ما هو تأثير تدخل الاتحاد الأوروبي في مجتمعك؟	المساعدة في تخفيف التطرف العنيف تفاقم التطرف العنيف لا تأثير على الإطلاق آخر _____ لا أعرف غير قابل للتطبيق	1 2 3 4 8 9
GBV 3	هل تعتقد أن وضعك أسوأ أو أفضل أو هو نفسه مع تدخل الاتحاد الأوروبي؟	1 أفضل؛ 2 أسوأ؛ 3 نفس حال؛ 8 لا أعرف 9 ؛غير قابل للتطبيق 1 2 3 8 9	
H1	ما رأيك في التفاوض مع الجماعات المتطرفة؟	يمكن أن يساعد في تخفيف التطرف العنيف سيؤدي إلى تفاقم التطرف العنيف لا تأثير آخر _____ لا أعرف غير قابل للتطبيق	1 2 3 4 8 9

Kurdish questionnaire for the case of Iraq

پڕێڤێکس			
MO1	ژمارەی ڕاپرسی	|__|__|__|__|__|	
MO2	مێژووی چاوپێکەوتن	|__|__|-|__|__|-|__|__|	
MO3	کۆدی توێژەر		1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
MO4	شوێنی چاوپێکەوتن	_____	
MO5	دەستپێکردنی چاوپێکەوتن (کات)	|__|__|:|__|__|	
MO6	کۆتاهاتنی چاوپێکەوتن (کات)	|__|__|:|__|__|	
باکگرواندی دیمۆگرافی و کۆمەڵایەتی و کار			
DE1	ڕەگەز	نێر مێ	1 2
DE2	تەمەن	18-25 26-39 40-60 60+	1 2 3 4
DE3	ڕەگەزنامەکەت چییە؟	عێراقی هی دیکە	1 2

DE	Question	Options		Codes
		نازانم جێبەجێ ناکرێ		3 8
DE 4	لە کوێ دەژی؟	شار و قەزا _____ نازانم جێبەجێ ناکرێ		1 8 9
DE 5	ئایینت چییه؟	ئیسلامی سوننه ئیسلامی شیعه مەسیحی ئێزیدی کاکەیی شەبەک سابئنەی مەندائی بەهائی زەردەشتی بێ دین هی دیکه نازانم ئیبەجێ ناکرێ		1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 12 13 8 9
DE 7	سەر بە چ نەتەوەیەکی؟		عەرەب کورد تورکمان کلد و ئاشوری هی دیکه نازانم جێبەجێ ناکرێ	1 2 3 4 5 8 9
DE 8	چەند ساڵ خوێندووتە؟	هیچ 3-5 6-7 8-11 12-13 14-16 17-20 نازانم جێبەجێ ناکرێ		1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
DE 9	دەتوانی نامه و رۆژنامه بخوێنیەوە؟	بەڵێ، به ئاسانی بەڵێ، بەڵام به زەحمەتی نەخێر نازانم جێبەجێ ناکرێ		1 2 3 8 9
DE 10	دەتوانی نامه و شتی دیکه بنووسی؟	بەڵێ، به ئاسانی بەڵێ، بەڵام به زەحمەتی نەخێر نازانم جێبەجێ ناکرێ		1 2 3 8 9
DE 11	بارودۆخی دارایت چۆنه؟	زۆر هەژار لە ژێر ناوەند		1 2

	3 4 5 8 9		ناوەند زیاتر لە ناوەند بەرز نازانم جێبەجێ ناکرێ		
	1 2 3 4 8 9		یەک / ڕۆژانە دوو / ڕۆژانە سێ / ڕۆژانە زیاتر لە سێ نازانم جێبەجێ ناکرێ	ڕۆژانە دەتوانی چەند ژەم بخۆی؟	DE 12

					پەرگیری توندوتیژ
ئەگەر وەڵامەکەت 1 بڕۆ بۆ SJ2 ئەگەر 2 ، 8، 9 بڕۆ بۆ H1	1 2 8 9		بەڵێ نەخێ نازانم جێبەجێ ناکرێ	ئایا کۆمەڵگەکەت ڕووبەڕووی پەرگیری بووەتەوە؟	SJ1
	1 2 3 8 9		ئایینی نەتەوەیی نێتنیکی چەپ نازانم جێبەجێ ناکرێ	چ جۆرە پەرگیرییەکە لە کۆمەڵگەکەت بوونی هەیە؟	SJ2
1بەڵێ؛ 2 نەخێر؛ 8 نازانم؛ 9 جێبەجێ ناکرێ، ئەگەر وەڵامەکە بە بەڵێ بوو، بڕۆ بۆ SJ 4 ، ئەگەر بە بەڵێ نەبوو، بڕۆ بۆ P1 1نعم؛ رقم 2؛8 لا أعرف 9؛ غیر قابل للتطبیق				ئەو جۆرە پەرگیرییە هەیە لە کۆمەڵگەدا بۆ سەرهەڵدەدا توندوتیژی؟؟	SJ3
	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9		هەژاری باوەڕی ئایینی کەمی ئاستی پەروەردە بێکاری بە عەسکەریکردن و بڵاوبوونەوەی هێزی چەکداری دەوڵەت خەڵک هەراسان دەکا هی دیکە (تکایە دیاری بکە) نازانم جێبەجێ ناکرێ	بۆچی خەڵک پشتگیری ئەو جۆرە گرووپ و هزرانە دەکات؟	SJ4
	1 بەڵێ؛ 2 نەخێر؛ 8 نازانم؛ 9 جێبەجێ ناکرێ			لە کۆمەڵگەکەت کێ بەرگری لەو جۆرە هزرانە دەکات؟	SJ5
	1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9		ئەو گەنجانەی بێکارن سەرکردە ئایینییەکان بە تەمەنەکان کەسایەتییەکانی کۆمەڵگە قوربانیانی توندوتیژی دەوڵەت بازرگان ئافرەتان		

1 زۆر رازیم؛ 2 رازیم؛ 3 وەکو پێویست نییە؛ 4 بە هیچ شێوەیەک رازی نیم؛ 8 نازانم؛ 9 جێبەجێ ناکرێ		ئایا رازی لە هاریکارییەکانی حکومەت و کۆمەڵگە نێودەوڵەتی بۆ کۆمەڵگەکەت؟	SJ6
	1 2 3 4 8 9	ئابووری	
	1 2 3 4 8 9	مرۆیی	
	1 2 3 4 8 9	سەرومەری یاسا	
	1 2 3 4 8 9	حوکمڕانئتی باش	
	1 2 3 4 8 9	چاکسازی کەرتی ئاسایش	

ئەزمونی کەسی لەگەڵ سیاسەتەکانی ڕێگەگرتن لە پەرگیری تۆندوتیژ	

هەموو وەڵامەکان جگە لە 1 بڕۆ بۆ پرسیاری GBV	1 2 8 9	بەڵێ نەخێر نازانم جێبەجێ ناکرێ	ئایا تۆ ئاگاداری لە بوونی بەرنامەی تایبەت بە ڕێگەگرتن لە پەرگیری تۆندوتیژ لە کۆمەڵگەدا؟	PE1
ئەگەر وەڵامەکەت (نازانم) یا (جێبەجێ ناکرێ) بڕۆ بۆ پرسیاری GBV	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	خزمەتگوزارییە حکومییەکان و ڕێکخراوە ناوخۆییەکان یەکێتی ئەوروپا نەتەوە یەکگرتووەکان ئەڵمانیا ئەمریکا وڵاتانی دیکە (تکایە دیاری بکە) ڕێکخراوە ناحکومییەکان (تکایە دیاری بکە) نازانم جێبەجێ ناکرێ	کام لەو ڕێکخراو و دەوڵەتانەی خوارەوە بەشدارن لە بەرنامەی ڕێگەگرتن لە پەرگیری تۆندوتیژ لە کۆمەڵگەدا؟	PE2
ئەگەر وەڵامەکەت (نازانم) یا (جێبەجێ ناکرێ) بڕۆ بۆ پرسیاری GBV	1 2 8 9	بەڵێ نەخێر نازانم جێبەجێ ناکرێ	پێتوایە ئەو ڕێکخراوانەی کار لەسەر ڕێگەگرتن لە پەرگیری تۆندوتیژ دەکەن لە کۆمەڵگەکەتدا یارمەتیدەر دەبن لە پاراستنی ئاشتی و یەکگرتووویی کۆمەڵایەتی؟	PE3
ئەگەر وەڵامەکەت (نازانم) یا (جێبەجێ ناکرێ) بڕۆ بۆ پرسیاری GBV	1 2 3 8 9	زۆر باشە ناوەندە زۆر لاوازە نازانم جێبەجێ ناکرێ	لەسەر بنەمای ئەزمونی کەسی خۆت، چۆن وەسفی هاریکارییەکان لە بواری ئاشتی و یەکگرتووویی کۆمەڵایەتی دەکەیت؟	PE4
	1 2 3 4 5 8 9	جۆرێکی دروست لە هاریکاری بەشێوەیەکی دروست ئاراستەکراوە – بۆ سودمەنبووی دروست بەشێوەیەکی دروست ئاراستەنەکراوە – وە بۆ سودمەندبووانی نادروست جۆرێکی هەڵە لە هاریکاری دۆخەکەی خراپتر کردووە هی دیکە _____ نازانم جێبەجێ ناکرێ	کام لەم وەسفانەی خوارەوە زیاتر دەگونجین لەگەڵ ئەو هاریکارییانەی پێشکەشکراون؟	PE5

				وجهات نظر عامة حول التزام الاتحاد الأوروبي في بلدك
GB V1	پێتوایە یەکێتی ئەوروپا دەزانێ چۆن دەبێ هاریکارییەکانی خۆی پێشکەش بکا؟		بەڵێ نەخێر نازانم جێبەجێ ناکرێ	1 2 8 9
GB V2	کاریگەری هاریکارییەکانی یەکێتی ئەوروپا لە کۆمەڵگەدا چۆنە؟		یارمەتیدەربووە لە کەمکردنەوەی پەرگیری توندوتیژ بووەتە هۆی زیاتربوونی پەرگیری توندوتیژ هیچ کاریگەری نییە هی دیکە ـــــــــــــ نازانم جێبەجێ ناکرێ	1 2 3 4 8 9
GB V3	پێتوایە بارودۆخت خراپتر یا باشتر یا وەکو خۆی ماوەتەوە دوای هاریکارییەکانی یەکێتی ئەوروپا؟	1 باشتر؛ 2 خراپتر؛ 3 وەکو خۆی؛8 نازانم؛ 9جێبەجێ ناکرێ		
		1 2 3 8 9		
H1	رای تۆ چییە لەسەر دانوستان لەگەڵ گرووپە پەرگیرەکان؟		دەبێتە هۆی کەمکردنەوەی پەرگیری توندوتیژی دەبێتە هۆی زیاتربوونی پەرگیری توندوتیژ هیچ کاریگەری نابێ هی دیکە ـــــــــــــ نازانم جێبەجێ ناکرێ	1 2 3 4 8 9